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Abstract Theorem provers produce evidence of proof in many different formats, such
as proof scripts, natural deductions, resolution refutations, Herbrand expansions, and
equational rewritings. In implemented provers, numerous variants of such formats are
actually used: consider, for example, such variants of or restrictions to resolution refu-
tations as binary resolution, hyper-resolution, ordered-resolution, paramodulation, etc.
We propose the foundational proof certificates (FPC) framework for defining the se-
mantics of a broad range of proof evidence. This framework allows both producers of
proof certificates and the checkers of those certificates to have a clear formal definition
of the semantics of a wide variety of proof evidence. Employing the FPC framework
will allow one to separate a proof from its provenance and to allow anyone to construct
their own proof checker for a given style of proof evidence. The foundation on which
FPC relies is that of proof theory, particularly recent work into focused proof systems:
such proof systems provide protocols by which a checker extracts information from the
certificate (mediated by the so called clerks and experts) as well as performs various
deterministic and non-deterministic computations. While we shall limit ourselves to
first-order logic in this paper, we shall not limit ourselves in many other ways. The
FPC framework is described for both classical and intuitionistic logics and for proof
structures as diverse as resolution refutations, natural deduction, Frege proofs, and
equality proofs.
1 Introduction
Of all topics in mathematics and computer science, one might expect that logic has
provided us with clearly defined and delimited standards. This expectation is partic-
ularly high since the study of logic and proof has existed since early work by Boole,
Frege, Hilbert, Russell, Whitehead, Go¨del, and Gentzen and since the resulting log-
ical systems are actively being studied and applied to a wide range of applications
in mathematics and computer science. But in practice, sadly, formal proofs are often
technology-specific: such “proof objects” are usually meant for a particular prover and
even a particular version of that prover. There should be, however, considerable value
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2in being able to have the multitude of computational logic systems—theorem provers,
model checkers, type checkers, static analyzers, etc.—share and check each other’s
proofs. Such advantages have been explicitly recognized in the SMT community by
Van Gelder when he wrote: “It is important to get our propositional house in order
to provide an adequate foundation for the more sophisticated challenge of producing
independently checkable proofs for SMT.” [38].
One way to realize the world-wide sharing and checking of proofs is to ask compu-
tational logic systems to export their proof evidence as documents with clear seman-
tics that can be validated by trusted checkers. If checkers can be small and formally
specified, then one might be able to trust their correctness by formally proving them
correct or by allowing any number of people to reimplement them. (In contrast, the-
orem provers are, generally speaking, complex and evolving systems that are more
difficult to trust.) By the term proof certificate we mean an exported document that
contains the proof evidence discovered by a computational logic system. We propose
here a framework for defining the semantics of a wide range of proof certificates: since
we use proof-theoretic concepts to define this framework, we refer to this framework as
“foundational” in contrast to, say, technological. Our framework will allow the sequent
calculus of Gentzen (with a number of improvements) to actually serve as the semantic
framework for defining a wide range of the proof evidence that is (or could easily be)
output from theorem provers.
Two bright spots in standardization. One bright spot in the use of logic to provide a
standard in computational logic system is the role of simply typed λ-terms as a frame-
work for defining term structures and logical formulas. As Church has shown in [22],
his Simple Theory of Types (STT) provides an elegant and well understood framework
for defining terms, formulas, binding, and substitution. By varying the signature of
type constants, that framework can provide a specification of propositional formulas as
well as multi-sorted first-order logic formulas and various modal logics. Such a notion
of formula is popular and supported by a wide range of computational logic systems
today, such as Isabelle [73], λProlog [66], and Twelf [76]. A second bright spot is that
classical and intuitionistic logics have been identified as being important for most of
computational logic and that the set of theorems of these logics is well defined: see, for
example, textbooks such as [37,43,90]. We shall assume for the rest of this paper that
terms, formulas, and theorems for first-order classical and intuitionistic logics are well
established. Having fixed these, we turn our attention to the specification of proofs.
1.1 Dealing with many proof languages
If the designer of a prover wishes it to be part of a larger world where theorems and
proofs are shared, checked, and stored, that prover must output some document that
can be checked by trusted proof checkers. The problem is, of course, that there can
be many different kinds of proof evidence and, hence, many different kinds of “proof
languages” with which to deal. A resolution theorem prover might output a presentation
of a resolution refutation; a constructive logic prover might output a typed λ-term; a
bisimulation checker might output a set of pairs denoting a bisimulation; etc. Is it
necessary to have a separate checker for each of these many proof evidence formats?
Even then, how can one be completely clear and formal in providing the details of such
proof formats?
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example, in the early days of computer science, the structure of a programming lan-
guage was often defined by a particular piece of technology - a parser. Eventually,
the framework of grammars (specifically certain classes of context-free grammars) was
used to describe the structure of programming languages. In that way, any number
of people could implement parsers for a language described by a given grammar. Fur-
thermore, cross compilers could be written that automatically transformed grammar
specifications into actual parsers. In a similar fashion, the meaning of early program-
ming languages was often defined by a particular compiler or interpreter. Today we
generally insist that the semantics of a programming language is given by a formal
framework such as denotational semantics [87], structural operational semantic (SOS)
[77,78], or natural semantics [57]. The semantics of Standard ML, for example, has
been defined using natural semantics [70].
Just as frameworks were proposed for programming language structures (via gram-
mars) and semantics (via denotational, structured operational, and natural semantics),
we will provide in this paper a framework for defining the semantics of proof languages.
The framework that we present here is not the only possible universal framework pos-
sible or proposed: for example, the λΠ-modulo system [24] has been proposed, im-
plemented, and applied to the checking of proofs from a number of constructive logic
theorem prover (see Section 13).
1.2 What can be learned about proof structure from proof theory
Several different and concrete approaches to structuring proofs have been developed
within the proof theory literature. We overview a few of these here.
The earliest formalized notions of proof are now often called Frege-Hilbert proofs
(Frege proofs, for short): such proofs are sequences of formulas such that any formula
is either an axiom or is the result of applying an inference rule to formulas that precede
it. Such proofs provide a high degree of trust in what they prove. The LCF approach
to theorem proving [47] can be directly linked to such proof systems. In particular, the
axioms are given the type thm, the inference rules are then (partial) functions of type,
say, thm -> thm and thm -> thm -> thm. Finally, the type thm is declared to be an
abstract datatype (thus, no additional primitives for building terms of type thm can be
added). Any object that can be build of type thm in such a well-typed programming
language as ML can be trusted to encode a theorem. As a notion of proof itself, such
proof objects have little useful structure. In the LCF setting, proof scripts—specific
instructions that lead the prover to a proof—are often used as proofs although modern
LCF provers are capable of generating more abstract proof objects as well.
Natural deduction proofs for intuitionistic logic [39,79] provide a much richer setting
for studying proof. For example, proofs can be normal or non-normal and functional
computations can be performed on non-normal proofs in order to produce normal
proofs. In addition, computational information can often be extracted from normal
proofs. Furthermore, this paradigm can be augmented via the deduction modulo frame-
work to allow even more opportunities for functional-style computations within proofs
[30]. Dependently typed λ-calculi have been used to encode natural deduction proofs
in a number of computer systems, for example, Automath, Coq, Twelf, and Agda, to
mention a few.
4While sequent calculus proof systems [39] are a flexible way to compare proofs in
classical, intuitionistic, and linear logics and to prove cut-elimination theorems, such
proofs are surprisingly unstructured and chaotic. In one of the earliest applications
of sequent calculus to computational logic [67], logic programming was described as
the search for certain normal forms of sequent calculus proofs (the so-called uniform
proofs) that involved two alternating phases of inference rules—one phase captured
goal reduction and one phase captured backchaining. Andreoli [1] lifted this notion of
two-phase alternating proof to all of linear logic and, thereby, introduced the notion of
focused proof system. Various focused proof systems for intuitionistic logic [14,32,50,
53] and classical logic [25,42,59] appeared shortly afterwards.
Focused proof systems will play a central role in the FPC framework. In particular,
we shall use the LJF and LKF focused proof systems of [60] (see Figures 5 and 13)
since they offer a framework in which most other focused proof systems can be seen as
subsystems.
1.3 The atoms, molecules, and chemistry of inference
The sequent calculus of Gentzen (especially as it is refined by Girard in linear logic
[41]) provides us with very small elements of inference: in particular, the introduction
rules for connectives, the structural rules of weakening and contraction (we shall avoid
Gentzen’s exchange rule), and the identity rules of initial and cut. We shall (informally)
refer to these inference rules as the atoms of inference. Sequent calculus proofs can be
rather chaotic in structure since the appearance of one occurrence of an inference rule
does not generally predict the occurrence of any adjacent inference rule.
Since focused proof systems are composed of alternating phases, we will be able
to identify entire phases with larger units of inference. Thus, we can say that focused
proof systems provide the rules of chemistry that identify which atoms stick together
(to form phases) and which separate to form boundaries (between phases). In classical
and intuitionistic logics, there is a great deal of flexibility in how such phases can be
constructed. We shall equate the molecules of inference (also called synthetic rules or
macro-level rules) with these phases.
This chemistry of inference will be used to build a framework for defining proof
semantics that satisfies the four desiderata laid out in [64] for a general notion of proof
certificates.
D1: A simple checker can, in principle, check if a proof certificate denotes a proof.
Simplicity is helped by the fact that the checker need only implement the atoms of
inference and the rules of chemistry. Since both of these are small and closed sets,
the checker size and complexity can, in principle, be limited.
D2: The format for proof certificates must support a wide range of proof systems. Since
the rules of chemistry allow for flexibility in how the atoms of inference can be
organized into phases, these phases can be made to match the reasoning steps
taken within different styles of proof.
D3: A proof certificate is intended to denote a proof in the sense of structural proof
theory. The ultimate elaboration of a proof certification involves the elaboration of
the molecules of inference into their constituent sequent calculus inference rules.
Thus, a sequent calculus proof is implicitly built during checking, satisfying this
desideratum.
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checker must be able to do some proof reconstruction. As we shall illustrate later, the
search space for focused proofs will only use allowed molecules and will not produce
unintended molecules of inference by randomly assembling atomic inference rules.
1.4 Machine-machine transmission and checking of formal proofs
In what follows, we shall be concerned with formal and not with informal proofs.
Our goal is to describe how one machine might generate a proof that another machine
checks. There is no intention here that humans should be able to read or learn from such
formal proofs. It might well be the case that certain proof evidence is both formal and
human readable: such a happy accident is not to be expected in general. Of course, one
might want to browse and interact with formal proofs in order to understand them.
To that end, tools that allow such interactions might be built since, by desiderata
D3 above, formal proof semantics are not ad hoc structures because they ultimately
elaborate into sequent calculus proofs which have a rich meta-theory (including, for
example, cut-elimination).
2 Proof checking as computation and interaction
The Poincare´’s Principle [4] states that proofs do not need to contain computations
since computations are routine and can be performed by a proof checker without in-
structions coming from the proof. For example, a proof checker can verify that 2+2 = 4
without having computation steps occupy space in the proof. Most illustrations of this
principle generally view computation as a functional program: in particular, compu-
tation is deterministic. However, any general approach to proof representation should
also allow non-deterministic computation in the sense of relational programming. It is
well known that non-determinism is a powerful computing resource and if one is con-
cerned about the size of proofs certificates, non-determinism can help reduce the size
of certificates: witness, for example, the difference is sizes between deterministic and
non-deterministic finite state machines accepting the same language, or the difference
between the complexity classes P and NP . Also, a focus on non-deterministic com-
putations does not remove our ability to use only deterministic computations within
proof checking if one wishes.
Communication and interaction can also be seen as intimately related to proof
and proof checking. There are, of course, well-known connections between proof and
winning strategies in game theory [27,51,62]. We shall view proof checking as involving
interactions between the proof checker and the proof certificate.
2.1 Navigating a robot through corridors and mazes
In order to better illustrate the kind of interaction and computation that we have
in mind for proof checking, consider the problem of having a simple robot navigate
through the maze of offices and corridors in an office complex. The proof that there is
a path from office A to office B can be witnessed by navigating a robot through the
6corridors and offices without going through or over walls. Navigation instructions can
be structured as follows.
When the robot is at the start of a corridor, we tell the robot (via a radio link) to
traverse that corridor. At that point, the robot can turn off its radio (to save power)
and compute its path through the corridor. Once the robot reaches the end of the
corridor, it turns on its radio again and waits for instructions to navigate the maze of
offices it has encountered. We would then interact repeatedly with the robot in order to
offer instructions (such as “turn left then forward 5m then turn right”) until it reaches
its final destination or another corridor. Thus, in this way, we can move through an
office complex with communications active only during actual mazes of office and not
during corridors.
Moving through corridors is a deterministic computation. Navigating a maze does
not necessarily require complete and precise instructions. If the robot has enough sen-
sors, the navigator can also give instructions such as “find the second left turn and take
that.” Non-deterministic computations can also be valuable here in this setting. For
example, every night, when the robot is guided back to the warehouse for recharging,
we can navigate the robot to the entrance of the warehouse and then ask it to search
the warehouse for an open electric plug. In principle, this computation might be non-
deterministic since there might be several such plugs and any one might be picked. We
might well expect, however, such a search to always terminate given our knowledge of
how warehouses are designed and how many other robots might be parked there.
2.2 Sorting out this analogy
When we present our first focused proof system in Section 4, its most striking feature
is that they build proofs in two different phases, called the asynchronous phase and
the synchronous phase. A robot moving down a long corridor can be modeled by
an asynchronous phase: that phase is characterized by determinate computations and
no communications. The robot moving through a maze of offices corresponds to the
synchronous phase where communications is useful in order to make a backtrack-free
path.
If one gives the checker some additional computational capabilities, we can, like
a robot with sensors and the ability to do search, give less explicit and less precise
instructions, such as, “the final destination is immediately behind one of the doors on
the right”. An implementation of proof checking within a logic programming setting
allows such high-level instructions to be effectively executed by the checker. In the
implementation of such a checker, a non-deterministic computation can be captured
via backtracking search.
3 Two proof systems for propositional classical logic
To illustrate how a sequent calculus proof system can be used to describe interactive
protocols, we consider in this section two different proof systems, LKneg and LKpos,
for classical propositional logic. In both cases, we shall assume that formulas are in
negation normal form (that is, negations have only atomic scope), that the logical




` ∆;L, Γ store ` ∆,A,¬A; · init
` ∆;Γ
` ∆; f, Γ
` ∆;B,C, Γ
` ∆;B ∨ C, Γ ` ∆; t, Γ
` ∆;B,Γ ` ∆;C, Γ
` ∆;B ∧ C, Γ
Fig. 1 The LKneg proof system
` B; · ;B
` B start
` B;N ,¬A;B
` B;N ;¬A restart ` B;N ,¬A;A init
` B;N ;Bi
` B;N ;B1 ∨B2 i ∈ {1, 2} ` B;N ; t
` B;N ;B1 ` B;N ;B2
` B;N ;B1 ∧B2
Fig. 2 The LKpos proof system
LKneg and LKpos is trivial to establish: their completeness follows directly from the
completeness of the LKF system that we present in Section 4.
3.1 LKneg and the invertible inference rules
The LKneg proof system (see Figure 1) will use only the invertible inference rules for
introducing both conjunction and disjunction. In this proof system, a sequent contains
two zones and is written as ` ∆;Γ , where ∆ is a multiset of literals, Γ is a list of
formulas, and L (in the store rule) is a literal. Notice that the four introduction rules
and the store rule work only on the first member of the second zone of a sequent. A
dot is used to denote both an empty list and an empty multiset.
Clearly, the LKneg proof system describes a decision procedure for propositional
classical logic in the following sense.
1. Given a formula B, there is a unique derivation ΠB of ` B with premises of the
form ` ∆; ·. That is, ΠB is functionally determined from B.
2. The formula B is a tautology if and only if every premise of ΠB is such that its
first zone contains an atomic formula and its complement.
The implied decision procedure for proving B is first to build ΠB and then check that
every premise in ΠB contains complementary pairs of literals. Clearly, this decision
procedure is essentially the same as rewriting B into conjunctive normal form and
then checking that every disjunction in that normal form has complementary literals.
It is also clear that this decision procedure has exponential time complexity.
There is some non-determinism possible in this proof system in the sense that there
might be more than one way to decompose a multiset of literals into ∆,A,¬A in the
init rule. For example, the formula (p ∨ p) ∨ ¬p can be seen as having two different
proofs.
3.2 LKpos and non-invertible rules
The LKpos proof system (see Figure 2) uses the non-invertible inference rule for intro-
ducing disjunction. In this proof system, a sequent contains three zones and is written
as ` B;∆;C, where B is a (fixed) formula, ∆ is a multiset of negated atoms, and C is
a formula. Notice that introduction rules only introduce the formula in the third zone
8C ` B; · ;B
C ` B start
C ` B;N ,¬A;B
C ` B;N ;¬A restart emp ` B;N ,¬A;A init
C ` B;N ;B1
l(C) ` B;N ;B1 ∨B2
C ` B;N ;B2
r(C) ` B;N ;B1 ∨B2 emp ` B;N ; t
L ` B;N ;B1 R ` B;N ;B2
c(L,R) ` B;N ;B1 ∧B2
Fig. 3 The LKpos proof system augmented with a certificate
〈C, emp〉 ` B; · ;B
C ` B start
〈I,O〉 ` B;N ,¬A;B
〈I,O〉 ` B;N ;¬A restart 〈I, I〉 ` B;N ,¬A;A init
〈I,O〉 ` B;N ;B1
〈l(I), O〉 ` B;N ;B1 ∨B2
〈I,O〉 ` B;N ;B2
〈r(I), O〉 ` B;N ;B1 ∨B2
〈I, I〉 ` B;N ; t
〈I,M〉 ` B;N ;B1 〈M,O〉 ` B;N ;B2
〈I,O〉 ` B;N ;B1 ∧B2
Fig. 4 The LKpos proof system augmented with a certificate
of a sequent. The restart rule is responsible for both “storing” a negated literal in the
third zone as well as restarting the proof process by copying the formula B in the first
zone and placing it into the third zone.
The LKpos proof system does not yield a decision procedure in the same, direct
sense that LKneg does. In particular, the restart rule can lead to unbounded proof
search: consider, for example, proving ` ¬p, for some propositional constant p.
The bottom-up development of an LKpos proof for a given sequent is determinate
except for the introduction rule for the disjunction. In that case, the proof system needs
to choose between the left and right disjunction. Thus, one could view the essence
of a proof in LKpos as the information needed to answer that one question every
time a disjunction is encountered (reading proofs from conclusion to premises). It is,
thus, an easy matter to develop a certificate for LKpos proofs that explicitly provides
those choices. Such a certificate can be formalized using terms built from the following
constructors: l and r are constructors of one argument, c is a constructor of 2 arguments,
and emp is a constructor of no arguments. Notice that the formula (¬p ∨ q) ∨ p (for
propositional constants p and q) has a proof in LKpos that is given by the term
l(l(r(emp))): that is, l(l(r(emp))) ` (¬p∨ q)∨ p is provable using the rules in Figure 3.
This notion of certificate is similar to the use of “oracles as streams of bits” as rep-
resentations of proofs in [72]. More precisely, the certificate structure used in Figure 3
is better named an oracle tree since it uses a binary constructor c to pair together
two other oracle trees. A simple variation of the certificate format described above can
reorganize the choices of left/right into, instead, oracle strings. Consider removing the
c constructor and use, instead, a pair of two oracle strings. Figure 4 contains a suitably
instrumented version of the LKpos inference rule: there, a certificate is such a list of
left/right choices but internally to the proof system, a pair of such lists is used. In
general, when an inference rule is labeled with the certificate term 〈I,O〉, then O is a
tail of the list I and the formal difference between these two lists is the sequence of
left/right choices that were consumed in building this proof.
93.3 A proof system can yield a protocol
The description of a specific proof of a given formula in LKneg and in LKpos are
radically different. For example, consider interacting with someone (called the checker)
attempting to build a proof bottom-up in LKneg: except for the init rule, there is no
choice in how the proof building process is conducted. At every step, the checker simply
needs to apply the only rule that is possible in the only way that is possible. With the
init rule, a choice is possible since we need to select a complementary pair of literals
from a multiset of literals and there can be multiple such pairs. Our interaction with
the checker building such a proof might either involve telling her the pair or letting her
find such a pair on her own, given that such a search is bounded and simple.
On the other hand, assume that the checker is attempting to build a proof in LKpos.
Here, the checker will need to ask from us what to do with every disjunction: should
she select the left or right disjunct? There is also a choice in the init rule again: this
time, the choice is between possibly different negated atoms within the N zone to pick
and we can let the checker search for her own answer to the init question.
Consider how these two protocols work on the formula (¬p∨C)∨p, where C is some,
possibly large propositional formula. This formula is clearly a tautology. A checker
building an LKneg proof will initially fall silent and build a possibly huge derivation,
stopping only when she wants to apply the init rule (then either asking for a pair of
complementary literals or searching for them). Of course, a possibly exponential (in the
size of C) number of such premises might be built and p and ¬p will occur in every one
of them. Thus, this checker might run in exponential time but consume no information
from an external source. Therefore, checking time can be exponential but interaction
can be constant sized. On the other hand, the LKpos proof can consume some “clever”
information from a proof certificate and, as a result, terminate quickly. In particular,
the certificate l(l(r(emp))) can steer the (augmented) LKpos proof system to a proof
independent of the formula C. Thus, if we are willing to communicate some information
to the checker, we can have drastic improvements in checking time.
We shall now present a more ambitious proof system for classical logic, one that, in
a sense, mixes the inference rules in LKneg and LKpos into one, hybrid proof system.
It will also include first-order quantification.
4 LKF as a framework for classical focused proofs
Figure 5 presents the LKF focused proof system for first-order classical logic [60]. The
sequents of this proof system contain polarized formulas instead of ordinary (unpolar-
ized) formulas. A polarized formula results from taking an ordinary first-order classical
formula and replacing every occurrence of propositional connectives and constants with
the corresponding occurrence of a positive or negative version of that connective or con-
stant. The polarized versions are formed by affixing a superscripted + or − symbol.
Thus, an occurrence of ∨ can be replaced by an occurrence of either ∨+ or ∨−. If B
is a formula with n occurrences of propositional connectives and constants then there
are 2n different polarized versions of B. The quantifiers have unambiguous polarities:
the existential quantifier is positive and the universal quantifier is negative.
A polarized formula is positive if its top-level connective is a positive connective
(∨+, ∧+, t+, f+, ∃) or an atomic formula. Similarly, a polarized formula is negative
if its top-level connective is a negative connective (∨−, ∧−, t−, f−, ∀) or a negated
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Asynchronous introduction rules
` Γ ⇑ t−, Θ
` Γ ⇑A,Θ ` Γ ⇑B,Θ
` Γ ⇑A ∧− B,Θ
` Γ ⇑Θ
` Γ ⇑ f−, Θ
` Γ ⇑A,B,Θ
` Γ ⇑A ∨− B,Θ
` Γ ⇑ [y/x]B,Θ
` Γ ⇑ ∀x.B,Θ †
Synchronous introduction rules
` Γ ⇓ t+
` Γ ⇓B1 ` Γ ⇓B2
` Γ ⇓B1 ∧+ B2
` Γ ⇓Bi
` Γ ⇓B1 ∨+ B2
i ∈ {1, 2} ` Γ ⇓ [t/x]B` Γ ⇓ ∃x.B
Identity rules
` ¬Pa, Γ ⇓ Pa init
` Γ ⇑B ` Γ ⇑ ¬B
` Γ ⇑ · cut
Structural rules
` Γ,C ⇑Θ
` Γ ⇑ C,Θ store
` Γ ⇑N
` Γ ⇓N release
` P, Γ ⇓ P
` P, Γ ⇑ · decide
Here, P is a positive formula; N a negative formula; Pa a positive literal; C a positive formula
or negative literal; and ¬B is the negation normal form of the negation of B. The proviso
marked as † is the usual eigenvariable restriction: y is not free in Θ, in Γ , nor in ∀x.B.
Fig. 5 LKF: a focused proof systems for classical logic
atomic formula. The notion of de Morgan duals is extended to polarized connectives
following the pairing t−/f+, t+/f−, ∨+/∧−, ∨−/∧+, and ∀/∃. Negation is not a proper
logical connective: we assume that all classical formulas are in negation normal form,
meaning that the ¬ symbol has only atomic scope. When we write ¬B, for a non-atomic
polarized formula B, we mean the polarized formula that results from computing the
de Morgan dual of the connectives and literals within B. We shall sometimes refer to
polarized formulas as simply formulas when it is clear from context which we mean.
The LKF proof system uses two kinds of sequents. The up-arrow sequents ` Γ ⇑Θ
and the down-arrow sequents ` Γ ⇓ B. In both cases, Γ is a multiset of formulas, Θ
is a list of formulas, and B is a formula. We say that the up or down arrows divide
sequents into two zones, namely the collection of formulas to the left or to the right of
the arrow. The left zone is called storage. It is most accurate to consider such sequents
as one-sided sequents since these two sequents can be approximated as the sequents
` Γ,Θ and ` Γ,B, respectively. Introduction rules are applied to the first element of
the second zone of both of these sequents.
Proofs in LKF are built using two kinds of alternating phases. The asynchronous
phase is composed of invertible inference rules and only involves ⇑-sequents in the
conclusion and premise. The other phase is the synchronous phase: here, applications
of such inference rules often require choices. In particular, the introduction rule for the
disjunction requires selecting either the left or right disjunct and the introduction rule
for the existential quantifier requires selecting a term for instantiating the quantifier.
The initial rule can terminate a synchronous phase and the cut rule can restart an
asynchronous phase. Finally, there are three structural rules in LKF. The store rule
recognizes that the first formula to the right of the ⇑ is either a negative atom or a
positive formula: such a formula does not have an invertible introduction inference rule
and, hence, its treatment is delayed by storing it on the left. The release rule is used
when the formula under focus (i.e., the formula to the right of the ⇓) is no longer
positive: at such a moment, the phase changes to the asynchronous phase. Finally, the
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decide rule is used at the end of the asynchronous phase to start a synchronous phase
by selecting a previously stored positive formula as the focus.
Notice that negative non-literal formulas are treated linearly in the sense that they
are never weakened nor contracted. Only positives formulas are contracted (in the
decide rule) and only negative literals and positive formulas are weakened (in the init
rule). The following theorem about LKF is proved in [60].
Theorem 1 Let B be a classical, first-order formula.
1. If B is a theorem then for every polarization Bˆ of B, the sequent ` · ⇑ Bˆ has an
LKF proof.
2. If Bˆ is a polarization of B and if ` · ⇑ Bˆ has an LKF proof then B is a theorem.
3. If a sequent has an LKF proof, it has a cut-free LKF proof.
The right zone in the up-arrow sequent is a list. It is possible to make that zone into
a multiset instead but we refrain from doing this for two reasons. First, the completeness
of LKF (Theorem 1) is a stronger result when the Θ context is a list, and second, the
behavior of proof construction in LKF is more deterministic and that lends itself to a
more predictable protocol between a proof checker and proof certificate.
It is straightforward to prove the completeness of the LKneg and LKpos proof
systems given Theorem 1. In particular, the LKneg system corresponds to using LKF
when all propositional connectives have been polarized negatively and the LKpos sys-
tem corresponds to using LKF when all propositional connectives have been polarized
positively. In the late case, the rule called restart in LKpos is a combination of the
LKF rules store and decide.
Example 1 In order to present a simple macro-level inference rule, assume that Γ
contains the formula a ∧+ b ∧+ ¬c. An LKF proof in which the root inference rule is a
decide rule applied to this formula must have the following form.
` Γ ⇓ a init ` Γ ⇓ b init
` Γ,¬c ⇑ ·
` Γ ⇑ ¬c store
` Γ ⇓ ¬c release
` Γ ⇓ a ∧+ b ∧+ ¬c
` Γ ⇑ · decide
Given the design of the focused initial rule, this derivation is possible if and only if Γ is
of the form ¬a,¬b, Γ ′. Thus, deciding on this formula encodes the following synthetic
inference rule.
` ¬a,¬b,¬c, Γ ′ ⇑ ·
` ¬a,¬b, Γ ′ ⇑ ·
While checking the applicability of individual sequent calculus inference rules can
be done effectively, checking synthetic inference rules may, in fact, require exponential
time and or space: consider, for example, the synthetic inference rules that correspond
to the LKneg proof system. Thus, synthetic rules are not always inference rules in the
sense of Cook [23] where inference rules must be polynomially checkable.
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Asynchronous Rules
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇑Θ fc(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑ f−, Θ
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇑A,Θ Ξ2 ` Γ ⇑B,Θ ∧c(Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑A ∧− B,Θ
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇑A,B,Θ ∨c(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑A ∨− B,Θ Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑ t−, Θ
(Ξ1 y) ` Γ ⇑ (B y), Θ ∀c(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑ ∀x.B,Θ †
Synchronous Rules
te(Ξ0)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇓ t+
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇓B1 Ξ2 ` Γ ⇓B2 ∧e(Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇓B1 ∧+ B2
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇓Bi ∨e(Ξ0, Ξ1, i)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇓B1 ∨+ B2
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇓ (B t) ∃e(Ξ0, Ξ1, t)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇓ ∃B
Identity rules
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇑B Ξ2 ` Γ ⇑ ¬B cute(Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2, B)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑ · cut
l : ¬Pa ∈ Γ inite(Ξ0, l)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇓ Pa init
Structural rules
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇑N releasee(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇓N release
Ξ1 ` Γ ⇓ P l : P ∈ Γ decidee(Ξ0, Ξ1, l)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑ · decide
Ξ1 ` Γ, l : C ⇑Θ storec(Ξ0, Ξ1, l)
Ξ0 ` Γ ⇑ C,Θ store
The proviso † requires that y is not free in Ξ,Θ, Γ,B. Notice also that in that same rule Ξ1 is
a term-level abstraction over certificates and B is a term-level abstraction over formulas (as it
is also in the ∃-introduction rules).
Fig. 6 The augmented LKF proof system LKFa.
5 Augmented LKF and checking certificates
We are now in a position to describe in detail how the LKF proof system can be used to
provide a protocol for mediating the communications between a proof checker, whose
architecture is described in this section, and foundational proof certificates, introduced
in the following section.
We present an analogy to help convey the spirit of the intended protocol. Imagine
an accounting office which is charged with checking if a certain mound of financial
documents represents a legal transaction as judged by some particular tax code. The
tax office staff is divided into two groups. The workers called experts are given the
responsibility of looking into the mound and extracting information: they must decide
into which series of transactions to dig and they need to know when to release their
findings for storage and later reconsideration. On the other hand, the workers called
clerks are responsible for taking information released by the experts and performing
various computations on them, including their indexing and storing. The justification
of this division of effort between clerks and experts comes from the structure of focused
sequent proof systems: experts operate during the synchronous phase of proof construc-
tion while clerks operate during the asynchronous phase. Furthermore, the vocabulary
of decide, release, and store comes directly from the structural rules of LKF.
A formal definition of the augmentation of LKF, seen in Figure 6, is presented
along three directions.
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1. Every sequent in every inference rule is decorated with an additional argument,
labeled as Ξ, Ξ1, or Ξ2. These additional arguments are certificate terms or just
certificates, for short.
2. The first zone in all sequents has been changed from being a multiset of formulas
to being a multiset of pairs of the form l : B where B is a formula and l is an
index. Along with this change, the store and decide rules refer to indexes as well
as formulas.
3. Every inference rule in LKF (except the introduction rule for t−) is given an extra
premise which is an atomic formula with a top-level predicate that is either a “clerk
predicate” (subscripted with the letter “c”) or an “expert predicate” (subscripted
with the letter “e”). The definition of these “agents” provide the formal meaning
of certificates terms.
The LKF proof system can be recovered from LKFa by removing all occurrences
of the syntactic variable Ξ and by removing all premises with a subscripted e or c as
well as replacing all occurrences of tuples such as l : B with just B. For this reason,
any proof in LKFa is a proof in LKF, which guarantees the soundness of the LKFa
system.
An implementation of the augment focused proof system LKFa will be called a
kernel (for LKF). We describe in the next section the items that must be added to
the kernel—formal definitions of clerks and experts as well as the data structures
for indexes and certificate terms—in order to construct a complete proof checker. In
Section 8 we describe how to build a kernel along similar lines for intuitionistic first-
order logic and in Section 11 we describe an approach to implementing kernels using
the λProlog programming language.
6 Foundational proof certificates
A foundational proof certificate consists of a proof object written in a suitable language
along with the semantic definition of that language. A proof language is given meaning
by specifying how a proof object written in it can unfold into a sequent calculus proof,
in the same way a programming language is given meaning by specifying how its
instructions can be interpreted using some other low-level programming language (e.g.,
assembly language). The sequent calculus is arguably standard enough to serve as the
“assembly language of proof languages”. While a kernel based on it may not be able
to deal with certain aspects of proofs—such as “is this proof minimal”—it can provide
a means to ascertain that a given logical formula is a theorem.
The semantic definition of a class of proof objects is given through the specifica-
tion of five parameters. A proper proof certificate is then a pair, containing a specific
proof object and a reference to the formal semantic definition that is then used by
an implementation of LKFa to provide a proof checker for that proof object. The five
parameters—polarization, certificate terms, indexes, clerks, and experts—are described
below and are, collectively, called an FPC.
Polarization. Since provers work with unpolarized formulas but LKFa requires polar-
ized formulas, the first step in specifying a proof semantics involves choosing how to
polarize formulas. Exactly how to choose polarity depends on many considerations.
For example, an inspection of Figure 5 shows that the decide rule incorporates the
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only occurrence of the contraction rule. Therefore a positive polarity must be given to
formulas that one wishes to make “contractible”. Similarly, if one wishes to perform a
deterministic computation within a proof—such as reducing a clause to a multiset of its
literals—then all the connectives in such a clause need to be given a negative polarity.
There is a great flexibility in polarizing connectives since it is possible to polarize some
occurrences of disjunctions and conjunctions as positive and some as negative, even
in the same polarized formula. Finally, the polarity choice of atoms can also greatly
influence the proofs one gets. Each atom can receive either a positive polarity (turning
the negation of that atom into a negatively polarized atom) or a negative polarity
(turning the negation of that atom into a positively polarized atom). In LKF we have
chosen to give all atomic formulas positive polarity: another treatment of the polarity
of atoms is described in Section 8.1.
Certificate terms. The signature for the certificate terms augmenting the LKF sequents
(via the schema variable Ξ) must be declared. When we explicitly list such signatures
below, we will identify constructors of certificate terms as any constant whose type
has target type cert. The different constructors are used to denote different “regions”
of the proof checking/reconstruction process: generally speaking, the clerk and expert
relations operate differently in different regions of the proof checking process. Terms
of type cert are threaded throughout the LKFa inference rules in a systematic way.
Because they are, in essence, the containers of a proof’s evidence, these terms will often
be referred to simply as “certificates”.
Indexes. The store and decide inference rules are responsible for moving formulas in
and out of storage. When a formula is put into storage using the store rule, it is assigned
an index and when we need to take a formula from storage in the decide rule, that
formula is addressed via an index. The exact structure of indexes is open to the author
of an FPC: in what follows, an index is any term of type index. Examples of indexes
can be numbers (such as de Bruijn indexes or clause numbers in resolution refutations).
They can also be terms representing occurrences of subformulas with a formula. There
is no assumption that indexes uniquely determine formulas: in some of the examples
we present starting in Section 7, many stored formulas have the same label: thus, when
the decide rule selects a formula by supplying an index, the dereferencing of that index
might be non-deterministic. Formulas can themselves be used as indexes in which case
such dereferencing is, of course, deterministic.
Experts. The synchronous inference rules in the augmented proof system LKFa are
given an extra premise that invokes an expert predicate that is responsible for ex-
amining a certificate term and extracting information from it, yielding continuation
certificates in the process. For example, the existential introduction rule invokes the
existential expert predicate in order to extract a term for witnessing the existential in-
stance. Keeping with the theme of making the FPC framework as flexible and general
as possible, experts may not exhibit actual expert behavior. For example, when the
disjunction expert is asked which disjunct to select, it might suggest both left and right.
Similarly, the exists expert is allowed to guess at any (every) term. This kind of flexibil-
ity is desirable since deterministic behavior is certainly allowed but non-determinism is
more general. The proof context itself might be a useful way to determine (via search)
the value of an existential witness. In other words, sometimes the best thing an expert
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can do is to let the checker search for the right instantiation term. We illustrate this
below in, for example, the resolution refutation checker.
Clerks. The asynchronous inference rules in the augmented proof system LKFa are
given an extra premise that invokes a clerk predicate that specifies the computations
that take place in that phase. For example, clerks are used to compute indexes for use
in the store rule and, if necessary, on which branch of a two-premise inference rule the
proof checking phase continues.
When we present examples of FPCs in the following sections, we use the concrete
syntax of λProlog [66]. We make this choice for several reasons [18]. First, it is useful to
have a typed specification language so that we can explicitly specify the constructors
of different datatypes denoting, for example, indexes, certificate terms, and formulas.
Such declarations can be written as λProlog signatures. Second, clerks and experts are
relations that are defined by inductive specifications: the Horn clauses available within
λProlog immediately and naturally allow such definitions to be written. Third, the
λ-tree syntax approach to treating bindings available in λProlog yields an immediate,
declarative, and effectively implemented approach to the computational treatment of
formula-level bindings (quantifiers) and proof-level bindings (eigenvariable). In any
case, the use of λProlog syntax is only one of convenience: when we use that syntax we
are describing nothing more than formulas in, say, Church’s Simple Theory of Types
(STT) [22]. No non-logical features of λProlog are used in this paper. All the λProlog
code described in this paper is available [20].
For readers familiar with, say, Prolog or ML, the syntax of λProlog should be easy
to read. We illustrate here two specific aspects of λProlog’s design: the syntax for
signatures and the syntax for term and formula binders.
To introduce a new type constructor, a kind declaration is used. Following the
example in Section 3.2, the line
kind oracle type.
can be used to declare a new type called oracle. Introducing the constructors for
building terms is done with type declarations. For example, the type declarations
type emp oracle.
type l, r oracle -> oracle.
type c oracle -> oracle -> oracle.
introduce four constants that can be used to build oracles.
The λ-abstraction is written as an infix backslash: that is, the term λx.t is written
in λProlog syntax as x\ t. The scope of this infix operator extends to the right as far
as possible consistent with parentheses: thus, (x\ y\ z\ t) is the λProlog encoding
of λx(λy(λz.t)). Following Church [22], quantifiers in formulas are decomposed into
a λ-binder and a constant denoting that quantifier. Thus, the existential and univer-
sal quantifiers ∃x.B and ∀x.B that are part of λProlog specifications are written as
(sigma x\ B) and (pi x\ B), respectively. Later in Section 9.2 we will need to ex-
plicitly encode first-order universal formulas as terms and in that encoding, we shall
similarly decompose that object-level quantifier, using the constant forall (instead of
pi which is used to denote the λProlog universal quantifier).
While we use λProlog code to specify most aspects of particular FPCs, it is only
meant to convey the formal semantic definition of a proof format. Whether or not
one actually uses λProlog to implement a proof checker for the defined proof format
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is a separate concern. We have used the Teyjus [71,80] implementation of λProlog to
build prototype proof checkers and to debug our FPC specifications. A number of other
means for implementing a formal semantic definition can, of course, be considered. The
logic programming perspective on proof checking is, however, rather powerful since it
incorporates in a familiar and systematic fashion unification and backtracking search.
Both of these tools can play useful roles in proof reconstruction during proof checking
[65].
7 Examples of FPCs in classical, first-order logic
We shall now present examples of FPCs in classical logic. For each example, the se-
mantic definition follows the same steps:
1. Provide a mapping of unpolarized formulas into polarized versions. Since the fo-
cused proof system LKF has twice the number of propositional connectives as stan-
dard first-order logic, one must decide how to treat, for example, the disjunction:
is it treated as invertible or not. The actual polarization for propositional connec-
tives and literals is chosen in concert with choosing the definition of the clerks and
experts (item 4 below).
2. Provide constructors of the type cert: this type is used to build the certificate
terms that are represented by the schema variable Ξ in Figure 6.
3. Provide constructors of the type index: this type is used to represent legal indexes
that are represented by the schema variable l in Figure 6.
4. Define the clerk and expert predicates.
Note that if an n-ary predicate (clerk, expert, or otherwise) is not specified by any
clauses, that predicate will never be provable and, hence, denotes the empty relation
on n arguments.
The names for clerks and experts will be written as tokens with three components:
the name for the connective introduced or the name for the structural rules, the string
_k, and either the letter e (for expert) or c (for clerk). When we later present clerks
and experts for intuitionistic logic, we replace the _k with _j. For example, orNeg kc
is the ∨−c clerk predicate from Figure 6.
7.1 CNF decision procedure
In Section 3.1, we introduced a proof system (and decision procedure) for propositional
classical logic that used only invertible introduction rules. We can describe an FPC that
can steer the LKF proof system to emulate the same proof system as follows. First, we
translate unpolarized, propositional classical logic formulas into polarized formulas by
translating ∧, t, ∨, f as ∧−, t−, ∨−, and f−, respectively. The rest of this FPC is given
in Figure 7. In particular, we declare each of the types cert and index as having exactly
one member each, namely, cnf and lit, respectively. Thus, the certificate essentially
contains just the name of a decision procedure and the only index used will have the
name lit. Finally, meaning is given to both of these constructors as well as to the four
clerk and the three expert predicates









decide_ke cnf cnf lit.
store_kc cnf cnf lit.
Fig. 7 An FPC providing a decision procedure based on conjunctive normal forms
by the theories for these predicates displayed in Figure 7. The clerk and expert predi-
cates not in this list are given an “empty theory” and thus do not hold for any argu-
ments.
As we have commented before (in Section 5), soundness is guaranteed: that is, it
is immediate to show that if Bˆ is the polarization of B using the negative versions of
disjunction and conjunction, then a proof of cnf ` · ⇑ Bˆ implies ` B in classical logic.
We can also make the following additional observations about this FPC.
– If Ξ ` Γ ⇑ Θ is provable then Ξ is the constant cnf and Θ is a multiset of pairs
lit : L where L is a literal.
– If Ξ ` Γ ⇓ B is provable then Ξ and Γ are as above and B is an atom such that
lit : B and lit : ¬B are members of Θ. An occurrence of such a sequent must be
both the premise of a decide rule and the conclusion of an initial rule.
Using these observations, the completeness of this encoding is simple to establish.
7.2 LKpos example
To provide a slightly more interesting notion of proof certificate, we can show how the
proof evidence (oracle strings) described in Section 3.2 can be described as an FPC.
First, we translate unpolarized, propositional classical logic formulas into polarized
formulas by translating ∧ and ∨ as ∧+ and ∨+, respectively (similarly for their units).
The rest of this FPC is given in Figure 8. In particular, the type index has two
inhabitants: root is used to label the restart formula and lit is used to label (negative)
literals. The proof certificate contains oracles, these have the same structure as the proof
evidence described in Section 3.2 and Figure 3. Since more than one inference rule of
LKFa is needed to encode the start and restart rules of LKpos, additional constructors
are used in certificates to connect these two inference rules in LKFa.
7.3 Resolution refutations
Binary resolution is a popular form of proof and we demonstrate an FPC that is able
to check an alleged (binary) resolution refutation. We review the key ideas behind
resolution refutations.
A (resolution) clause is a closed formula that is composed of universal quantifiers
around a disjunction of literals (the empty disjunction is identified with false). We use
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kind oracle type.
type emp oracle. % empty
type l, r oracle -> oracle. % left , right
type c oracle -> oracle -> oracle. % conjunction
kind cert type.
type start , restart oracle -> cert.
type consume oracle -> cert.
type root , lit index.
decide_ke (start Oracle) (consume Oracle) root.
store_kc (start Oracle) (start Oracle) root.
decide_ke (restart Oracle) (consume Oracle) root.
store_kc (restart Oracle) (restart Oracle) lit.
true_ke (consume emp).
initial_ke (consume emp) lit.
orPos_ke (consume (l Oracle )) (consume Oracle) left.
orPos_ke (consume (r Oracle )) (consume Oracle) right.
andPos_ke (consume (c Left Right )) (consume Left) (consume Right).
release_ke (consume Oracle) (restart Oracle ).
Fig. 8 An FPC based on oracle strings
C as a schema variable ranging over clauses. We assume that a certificate for resolution
contains the following items:
1. The proposed theorem ¬C1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Cn which is the disjunction of a number of
negated clauses.
2. A list of clauses Cn+1, . . . , Cp.
3. A list of triples 〈i, j, k〉 where each such triple claims that Ck is a binary resolution
(with factoring) of Ci and Cj .
If the implementer of a traditional, binary resolution prover wished to output a resolu-
tion refutation, a document containing these items should be easy to provide. Of course,
for such a structure to denote a proper refutation, one of the clauses Cn+1, . . . , Cp (usu-
ally the last one) must be the empty clause (denoted here as false).
As before, the first step in defining an FPC is describing how to polarize formulas.
For this FPC, we polarize disjunctions and false in clauses as negative and the conjunc-
tion and true in negated clauses as positive. We shall always assume that clauses have
negative polarity and that negated clauses always have positive polarity. If, for exam-
ple, a clause is just an atomic formula A (which has positive polarity), then we must
write that clause as, for example, A∨− f−. In what follows, the expression ¬Ci denotes
a polarized negated clause, that is, an existentially quantified positive-conjunction of
literals.
The first phase in building an LKFa proof of the proposed theorem ¬C1∨· · ·∨¬Cn
is the asynchronous phase using the clerks described in Figure 9 that are responsible
for interpreting the cert constructor start. These clerks steer the LKFa kernel to
build the following augmented, synthetic inference rule.
(start (n+ 1) R) ` (idx 1) : ¬C1, . . . , (idx n) : ¬Cn⇑
(start 1 R) ` ⇑¬C1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Cn
That is, this initial phase of proof building simply stores the negated clause ¬Ci with
the index (idx i).
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type idx int -> index.
type start int -> list method -> cert.
orNeg_kc (start C Resol) (start C Resol ).
false_kc (start C Resol) (start C Resol ).
store_kc (start C Resol) (start D Resol) (idx C) :- D is C + 1.
Fig. 9 Region one: Store the negated clauses that comprise the alleged theorem
kind method type.
type resol int -> int -> int -> method.
type rlist list method -> cert.
type rlisti int -> list method -> cert.
type rdone cert.
type lemma int -> form -> o.
cut_ke (start C Resol) C1 C2 Cut :- cut_ke (rlist Resol) C1 C2 Cut.
cut_ke (rlist (resol I J K::Rs)) (dlist [I,J]) (rlisti K Rs) Cut :-
lemma K Cut.
store_kc (rlisti K Rs) (rlist Rs) (idx K).
decide_ke (rlist []) rdone (idx I).
true_ke rdone.
Fig. 10 Region two: a sequence of cuts leading to the selection of the empty clause
The second phase in building this proof involves translating the resolution steps
into uses of the cut rule. An inspection of the inference rules in Figure 6 shows that the
only inference rules that are available when the context on the right of the ⇑ is empty
are the rules for cut and for decide. The specification in Figure 10 shows that when
the certificate term has start as its top-most constructor, that certificate can only be
used to build a cut-inference. In particular, if the list of resolvents R has 〈i, j, k〉 as its
first triple, then the cut-formula will be taken from the list of lemmas at position k.
Note that the predicate lemma is not part of the kernel but is code supplied by the
resolution refutation certificate: we use this predicate as a convenient storage for the
additional resolvents Cn+1, . . . , Cp.
If the first resolution step claims that clauses Ci and Cj (i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}) resolve
together to yield Ck then this claim is translated into the following proof fragment.
Here, Γ denotes the context (idx 1) : ¬C1, . . . , (idx n) : ¬Cn.
(dlist [i, j]) ` Γ ⇑ Ck
(rlist R) ` Γ, (idx k) : ¬Ck⇑
(rlisti R k) ` Γ ⇑ ¬Ck store
(start (n+ 1) (resol i j k::R) ` Γ⇑ cut
Note that the constructor rlisti is used to link the store inference rule (which needs
an index, here, k) and the cut rule (whose certificate terms contains the needed index).
This proof fragment reduces proof checking to two subproblems. The left premise con-
tains the subproblem of showing that the clause Ck is derivable using the context Γ (in
particular, using only clauses Ci and Cj). The right premise contains the subproblem
of showing that the enlarged sequent ` (idx 1) : ¬C1, . . . , (idx (n+ 1)) : ¬Cn+1⇑
can be checked using the remaining resolution triples. The search for a proof of the
right premise will now be guided by the constructor rlist which will cause all the
resolution triples in its argument to generate, in a similar fashion, additional cut in-
ferences. Once no more triples are stored in the certificate term, that is, the proof
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type lit index.
type dlist list int -> cert.
all_kc (dlist L) (x\ dlist L) & orNeg_kc (dlist L) (dlist L).
false_kc (dlist L) (dlist L) & store_kc (dlist L) (dlist L) lit.
decide_ke (dlist L) (dlist [J]) (idx I) :- L = [I,J] ; L = [J,I].
decide_ke (dlist [I]) (dlist []) (idx I).
decide_ke (dlist L) (dlist []) lit :- L = [I]; L = [].
initial_ke (dlist L) lit.
true_ke (dlist L).
andPos_ke (dlist L) (dlist L) (dlist L).
some_ke (dlist L) (dlist L) T.
release_ke (dlist L) (dlist L).
Fig. 11 Region three: a short proof checks an individual resolution step
reconstruction process reduces the proof certificate on the right branch of the proof to
the term (rlist []), the final step of that branch is the following proof fragment.
rdone ` (idx 1) : ¬C1, . . . , (idx p) : ¬Cp ⇓ ¬Ci t
+
(rlist []) ` (idx 1) : ¬C1, . . . , (idx p) : ¬Cp⇑ decide
The decide rule expert for the certificate term (rlist []) provides no special infor-
mation as to which index to select to start the focused phase: instead, it is allowed to
succeed with any index. At the same time, the certificate term is changed to rdone
and proof checking with this certificate term can succeed if and only if the formula
under focus, namely ¬Ci is t+ and this is only possible if Ci is f− (the empty clause).
Thus, the forced pairing of the decide rule and the t+ rule guarantees that this branch
terminates only if an empty clause has been reached. While we can restrict that empty
clause to be Cp, that is not necessary.
We are left with checking a series of subproofs of augmented sequents of the form
(dlist [i, j]) ` Γ ⇑ Ck, where the resolution refutation information contained in
the triple 〈i, j, k〉. It is a simple matter to prove the following: if clauses Ci and Cj
yield resolvent Ck as a binary resolvent (allowing also factoring), then there exists a
shallow, focused proof of the sequent ` ¬Ci,¬Cj ⇑ Ck. In particular, this proof can
be characterized as being built by focusing first on ¬Ci then on ¬Cj or by focusing
first on ¬Cj then on ¬Ci. In either case, that proof may need to be terminated with
one additional decide rule but this time on a literal. Thus, such a proof is bounded by
at most three decide rules: such proofs will, in principle, be easy to reconstruct. The
clerk and expert clauses in Figure 11 actually describe the full details of how such a
proof can be built. In particular, left premises of the cut rules will all start with proof
fragments that have the following shape.
(dlist [i, j]) ` Γ ′, lit : ρL1, . . . , lit : ρLq⇑
(dlist [i, j]) ` Γ ′ ⇑ Ck
Here, we assume the following.
– The clause Ck is of the form ∀x¯[L1 ∨− . . . ∨− Lq] for a list of variables x¯ and a list
of literals L1, . . . , Lq.
– The context Γ ′ is of the form (idx 1) : ¬C1, . . . , (idx m) : ¬Cm for some m such
that n ≤ m ≤ q
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– The substitution ρ denotes some renaming of the variables in the list x¯ and new
eigenvariables that have been inserted by the ∀-introduction rule.
Thus, this initial phase of proof construction essentially dissolves the clause Ck into
eigenvariables and a collection of stored literals. At this point, the decide expert pred-
icate non-deterministically selects either ¬Ci or ¬Cj to start the synchronous phase.
Which ever clause is selected, the certificate term will have the corresponding index
withdrawn so that the next time the decide rule must select an index, the other index
will be selected. Finally, the proof is completed by either attempting to prove ∧+ or
by selecting a literal which has a complement in the same context.
Example 2 Consider the following theorem, written as the disjunction of three negated
clauses.
¬(r z) ∨− [∃x.(r x) ∧+ ¬(r (k x))] ∨− (r (k (k (k (k z)))))
A resolution refutation for this formula can be given by making the following additional
assumptions used to name the clauses generated by resolutions.
lemma 4 (∀x.¬(r x) ∨− (r (k (k x)))).
lemma 5 (∀x.¬(r x) ∨− (r (k (k (k (k x)))))).
lemma 6 (r (k (k (k (k z))))).
lemma 7 f−.
Finally, the following certificate term denotes a particular resolution refutation that
can be used to prove the proposed theorem above.
start 1 (resol 2 2 4 :: resol 4 4 5 :: resol 1 5 6 :: resol 6 3 7 :: nil)
The indexes 1, 2, and 3 refer to the formulas that are stored in the first steps of the
proof construction.
One can specify various generalizations and specializations of this technique, in-
cluding, for example, hyper-resolution. We present here a simple variation to account
for factoring. If clause Cj results from factoring in clause Ci, then there is a simple
proof of the sequent ` ¬Ci ⇑ Cj and this proof can be guided by the clerk and expert
clauses contained in Figure 12. In order to accommodate factoring as a refutation step,
the type declarations in Figure 12 include a new construct of type method: the certifi-
cate term (factor i j) that claims that clause Cj results from factoring in clause Ci.
Similar to the treatment of the dlist constructor above, this certificate term instructs
the proof checking engine to first decide on ¬Ci and attempt to finish the proof using
only decides on literals.
Note that the proof certificate for resolution does not contain any explicit informa-
tion regarding how quantifiers should be instantiated: while this kind of information
can be included in the proof certificate, it seems far more natural and compact to leave
it out. This is particularly true in the setting of first-order logic where unification is a
simple and decidable operation. An implementation of the proof checking machinery
directly in a logic programming language, such as λProlog in these examples, makes
the reconstruction of substitution instances a simple feature of the above definition of
the resolution refutation format.
One final observation to make about this checker for resolution refutations: while
we have described a sound checker, one might wish to have a converse guarantee,
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type factor int -> int -> method.
type factr int -> cert.
type fdone cert.
cut_ke (rlist (factor I K ::Rs)) (factr I) (rlisti K Rs) Cut :-
lemma K Cut.
all_kc (factr I) (x\ factr I).
orNeg_kc (factr I) (factr I) & store_kc (factr I) (factr I) lit.
false_kc (factr I) (factr I) & decide_ke (factr I) fdone (idx I).
true_ke fdone & andPos_ke fdone fdone fdone.
some_ke fdone fdone T & decide_ke fdone fdone lit.
release_ke fdone fdone & store_kc fdone fdone lit.
initial_ke fdone lit.
Fig. 12 Describing how to check factoring between two clauses
namely, that if the checker succeeds with a given certificate term, then that term
denotes a proper resolution refutation. That property is not, however, the case for the
certificate format that we have described above. For example, while the resolution of
∀x[p(x)∨ r(f(x))] and ∀x[¬p(f(x))∨ q(x)] is ∀x[r(f(f(x)))∨ q(x)], the following clause
is also provable.
` ∃x[¬p(x) ∧ ¬r(f(x))],∃x[p(f(x)) ∧ ¬q(x)] ⇑ ∀x[r(f(f(f(x)))) ∨ q(f(x)) ∨ s(f(x))].
This formula is similar to a resolvent except it uses a unifier that is not most general
and it has an additional literal. The proof certificate mechanism above will actually
validate this entailment which is not a problem from the point-of-view of soundness.
8 Intuitionistic first-order logic
The structure of sequent calculus proof for intuitionistic logic is usually presented
with a two-sided sequent calculus and with the restriction that there is at most one
formula on the right-hand side of the sequent [39]. The sequent calculi of classical and
intuitionistic logics are close enough to make it possible to give a focusing system for
intuitionistic first-order logic that has many similarities with focusing in classical logic
(see Section 10 for a detailed relationship between focusing in these two logics). Below
we describe the LJF proof system for focusing first-order intuitionistic logic [60].
8.1 The LJF focused proof system
Focused proof systems involve polarized formulas. As we observed in the classical case,
both the conjunction and disjunction (and their units) can be polarized either positively
or negatively. When moving to the intuitionistic setting, we find that there are, indeed,
two polarities for conjunction and for truth which we write as ∧+, ∧−, t+, and t−. On
the other hand, there are not two polarities for ∨ but rather the two connectives ∨+
and ⊃. As a result, we shall simply write ∨ instead of ∨+ and write its unit as f instead
of f+. The polarity of ⊃ is negative and it has no unit. The polarities for ∀ and ∃ are
the same in the intuitionistic setting as in the classical setting.
In LKF, the polarity of atomic formulas was set globally to be positive. One could
instead arbitrarily assign polarity to atomic formulas although such flexibility is not
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Asynchronous Rules
Γ ⇑A ` B ⇑
Γ ⇑ ` A ⊃ B ⇑
Γ ⇑ ` A ⇑ Γ ⇑ ` B ⇑
Γ ⇑ ` A ∧− B ⇑ Γ ⇑ ` t− ⇑
Γ ⇑ ` [y/x]B ⇑
Γ ⇑ ` ∀x.B ⇑
Γ ⇑ [y/x]B,Θ ` R
Γ ⇑ ∃x.B,Θ ` R Γ ⇑ f,Θ ` R
Γ ⇑A,B,Θ ` R
Γ ⇑A ∧+ B,Θ ` R
Γ ⇑Θ ` R
Γ ⇑ t+, Θ ` R
Γ ⇑A,Θ ` R Γ ⇑B,Θ ` R
Γ ⇑A ∨B,Θ ` R
Synchronous Rules
Γ ` A ⇓ Γ ⇓ B ` R
Γ ⇓ A ⊃ B ` R
Γ ` Ai ⇓
Γ ` A1 ∨A2 ⇓
Γ ⇓ Ai ` R
Γ ⇓ A1 ∧− A2 ` R
Γ ` A ⇓ Γ ` B ⇓
Γ ` A ∧+ B ⇓ Γ ` t+ ⇓
Γ ⇓ [t/x]B ` R
Γ ⇓ ∀x.B ` R
Γ ` [t/x]B ⇓
Γ ` ∃x.B ⇓
Identity rules
Γ ⇓ Na ` Na initl Γ, Pa ` Pa ⇓ initr
Γ ⇑ ` F ⇑ Γ ⇑ F ` ⇑R
Γ ⇑ ` ⇑R cut
Structural rules
Γ,N ⇓ N ` R
Γ,N ⇑ ` ⇑R decidel
Γ ` P ⇓
Γ ⇑ ` ⇑ P decider
Γ ⇑ P ` ⇑R
Γ ⇓ P ` R releasel
Γ ⇑ ` N ⇑
Γ ` N ⇓ releaser
C, Γ ⇑Θ ` R
Γ ⇑ C,Θ ` R storel
Γ ⇑ ` ⇑D
Γ ⇑ ` D ⇑ storer
Here, P is positive, N is negative, C is a negative formula or positive atom, D a positive
formula or negative atom, Na is a negative atom, and Pa is a positive atom. Other formulas
are arbitrary.
Fig. 13 The intuitionistic sequent calculus LJF.
necessary in a classical setting: for example, if one wishes to have the atomic formula p
positive but the atomic formula q negative, one could simply change all occurrences of q
to ¬q and once again assume that q is positively polarized. Note that the intuitionistic
negation B ⊃ f is always negative no matter the polarity of the formula B. Thus in
intuitionistic logic, the option of assigning polarities to atomic formulas arbitrarily is
an important choice.
The synchronous sequent in LJF comes in two kinds, namely, the left focused
sequent Γ ⇓ B ` R and the right focused sequent Γ ` B ⇓. In both of these cases,
the formula B is under focus. Asynchronous sequents also come in two kinds, namely,
Γ ⇑Θ ` R⇑ or Γ ⇑Θ ` ⇑R. In both the synchronous and asynchronous sequents, B and
R are formulas and the zone marked with Γ is a multiset of formulas while the zones in
asynchronous sequents marked with Θ are lists of formulas. We shall sometimes write
an asynchronous sequent as Γ ⇑Θ ` R where R can be of the form ⇑ R or R ⇑ .
The inference rules for LJF are given in Figure 13. The basic structure of LJF is
rather similar to that of LKF in that they both classify inference rules as either identity
rules (initial and cut), structural rules (decide, release, and store), or introduction
rules (divided among asynchronous and synchronous rules). Let B be a (polarized)
intuitionistic formula and let Π be an LJF proof of the (end)sequent ⇑ ` B ⇑ . We list
some invariants that hold for the various sequents that appear in Π.
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1. Every occurrence of the sequent Γ ⇑Θ ` R or the sequent Γ ⇓ B ` R in Π is such
that Γ is a multiset of negative formulas and positive atoms.
2. Similarly, every occurrence of the sequent Γ ⇑ Θ ` ⇑ R or the sequent Γ ⇓ B ` R
in Π is such that R is a positive formula or a negative literal.
3. If Γ ⇑Θ ` R⇑ is the conclusion of a right-introduction rule, then Θ is empty.
The asynchronous introduction rules can actually be applied in any order without
changing the shape of focused proofs when one ignores the internal structure of phases.
As a result, we fix the order of processing asynchronous inferences in the following
natural order. First, elements of the list in the zone labeled Θ are introduced in the
order that they appear in that list. Second, an asynchronous introduction on the right
is applied only when the Θ zone is empty.
Besides the fact that sequents in LKF and LJF different in that the latter has two
sides and four zones, there are a couple of other key differences between these two proof
systems.
– While LKF provides two polarities of disjunction, LJF contains only the positive
disjunction while also allowing for the (negative polarity) implication.
– The store inference rule of LKF associates a formula with an index and that formula
remains stored with that index in all sequents appearing above that occurrence of
store rule. In LJF, the storel rule associates formulas to indexes is a similar fashion.
However, the storer rule stores the right-hand formula in a linear fashion: that is,
there can be at most one formula stored on the right in any sequent and the decider
rule removes that formula from storage. Thus, there is no need to provide an index
to the formula stored on the right since there is only the right-stored formula.
Despite these differences, it is possible to formally relate these two proof systems.
More about that relationship will be described in Section 10.
8.2 The LJFa focused proof system
Following the design of the LKFa proof system, we present the result of augmenting
LJF with suitable notions of clerks, experts, and indexes in order to get the LJFa proof
system of Figure 14. Note that, as in Section 5, we have added calls to clerk predicates
to all premises of all asynchronous introduction rules as well as the storeL and storeR
rules. Similarly, we have added calls to expert predicates to all other inference rules,
in particular, the synchronous introduction rules as well as the identity rules and the
release structural rules. We have also added an indexing mechanism that labels formulas
that are placed on the left of the sequents: that is, in LJFa, the Γ zone (on the left) is
a multiset of pairs 〈l, B〉 where l is an index and B is a formula. Such indexes are used
by clerks and experts to refer to formulas. In particular, the storeLc(·, ·, ·) predicate
is responsible for computing an index for a stored formula while the decideLe(·, ·, ·)
predicate is responsible for identifying a formula on which to focus by providing an
index for such a formula. We do not require that a context Γ containing an association
of indexes to formulas is functional: it is certainly possible and useful for there to be
a one-to-many relationship between indexes and formulas. Finally, note that the store
and decide structural rules also function on the right-hand-side of a sequent: in these




Ξ1 : Γ ⇑A ` B ⇑ ⊃c (Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` A ⊃ B ⇑
(Ξ1y) : Γ ⇑ ` [y/x]B ⇑ ∀c(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` ∀x.B ⇑
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ ` A ⇑ Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ ` B ⇑ ∧−c (Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` A ∧− B ⇑
t−c (Ξ0)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` t− ⇑
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑A,B,Θ ` R ∧+c (Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑A ∧+ B,Θ ` R
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑Θ ` R t+c (Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ t+, Θ ` R
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑A,Θ ` R Ξ2 : Γ ⇑B,Θ ` R ∨c(Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑A ∨B,Θ ` R
f+c (Ξ0)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ f,Θ ` R
(Ξ1y) : Γ ⇑ [y/x]B,Θ ` R ∃c(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ∃x.B,Θ ` R
Synchronous Rules
Ξ1 : Γ ` A ⇓ Ξ2 : Γ ⇓ B ` R ⊃e (Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇓ A ⊃ B ` R
Ξ1 : Γ ` Ai ⇓ ∨e(Ξ0, Ξ1, i)
Ξ0 : Γ ` A1 ∨A2 ⇓
Ξ1 : Γ ⇓ Ai ` R ∧−e (Ξ0, Ξ1, i)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇓ A1 ∧− A2 ` R
Ξ1 : Γ ` A ⇓ Ξ2 : Γ ` B ⇓ ∧+e (Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ0 : Γ ` A ∧+ B ⇓
t+e (Ξ0)
Ξ0 : Γ ` t+ ⇓
Ξ1 : Γ ` [t/x]B ⇓ ∃e(Ξ0, Ξ1, t)
Ξ0 : Γ ` ∃x.B ⇓
Ξ1 : Γ ⇓ [t/x]B ` R ∀e(Ξ0, Ξ1, t)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇓ ∀x.B ` R
Identity rules
initLe(Ξ0)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇓ Na ` Na
(l, Pa) ∈ Γ initRe(Ξ0, l)
Ξ0 : Γ ` Pa ⇓
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ ` F ⇑ Ξ2 : Γ ⇑ F ` ⇑R cute(Ξ0, Ξ1, Ξ2, F )
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` ⇑R
Structural rules
l : N ∈ Γ Ξ1 : Γ ⇓ N ` R decideLe(Ξ0, Ξ1, l)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` ⇑R
Ξ1 : Γ ` P ⇓ decideRe(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` ⇑ P
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ P ` ⇑R releaseLe(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇓ P ` R
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ ` N ⇑ releaseRe(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ` N ⇓
Ξ1 : l : C, Γ ⇑Θ ` R storeLc(Ξ0, Ξ1, l)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ C,Θ ` R
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ ` ⇑D storeRc(Ξ0, Ξ1)
Ξ0 : Γ ⇑ ` D ⇑
Fig. 14 The augmented intuitionistic sequent calculus LJFa. Here, P is positive, N is nega-
tive, C is a negative formula or positive atom, D a positive formula or negative atom, Na is a
negative atom, and Pa is a positive atom. Other formulas are arbitrary.
8.3 Simply typed λ-terms as proof certificates
It is a well-known observation that simply typed λ-terms can be seen as proofs (usually,
as natural deduction proofs in minimal logic) of the formulas that are encoded as types.
Thus, we should expect that a typed λ-term can be used as a proof certificate for its
type. We illustrate this by showing how simply typed λ-terms in η-long β-normal form
can be used as certificates.
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A simple type is an expression built from primitive types, say, i, j, and k, and the
function type constructor,→. If we identify primitive types with propositional variables
and → with intuitionistic implication, then simple type expressions can be identified
with propositional intuitionistic formulas. For example, the type expressions i→ j and
(i → i) → i → i correspond to the propositional formulas i ⊃ j and (i ⊃ i) ⊃ i ⊃ i.
Note that the first of these types is not a theorem while the second is.
A simply typed λ-term is in η-long β-normal form if it can be written in the form
λx1 . . . λxn.(h t1 . . . tm) where n ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0, h, x1, . . . , xn are variables, and
t1, . . . , tm is a list of terms that are in η-long β-normal form. Furthermore, for a term
to be in “η-long form”, the type of the term (h t1 . . . tm) must be a primitive type.
A representation of simply typed λ-terms that is suitable as a proof certificate
is the “nameless dummy” presentation of the λ-terms of de Bruijn [26]. In such a
representation of (untyped) λ-terms, a variable occurrence is replaced by a number
which indicates the number of intervening bindings between that occurrence and the
actual binder for that variable. Instead of formally defining this familiar concept, we
present in Figure 15 a few examples of λ-terms and their representation using de Bruijn
indexes along with their simple type. A quick reflection on the structure of terms using
λx.x λ0 i→ i
λxλy.y λλ0 j → i→ i
λxλy.(x y) λλ(1 0) (i→ j)→ i→ j
λxλyλz.(z (z x)) λλλ(0 (0 2)) i→ j → (i→ i)→ i
λxλy.y (λz.(z x)) λλ(0 (λ(0 2))) i→ (((i→ j)→ j)→ k)→ k
Fig. 15 A few λ-terms with their representation using de Bruijn indexes and a simple type.
de Bruijn indexes reveals that if we are using such a term to check an intuitionistic
formula, the λ symbol corresponds to the invertible implication-right introduction. As
a result, its presence in the proof certificate is not necessary. The key information,
however, is the name (i.e., the offset) of the head variable of the λ-terms: the type of
that head variable provides the formula on which the decideL inference rule focuses.
This observation suggests that a rather simple design for proof certificates can be
based on a nested structure of pairs, lists, and integers. In particular, let t be a λ-term
in η-long β-normal form, let θ be a function from the free variables of t to the non-
negative integers, and let d be a non-negative integer. We now define by recursion the
function [[θ | t]]d via the equation
[[θ | λx1 . . . λxn(h t1 . . . tm)]]d = 〈θ′h, [[[θ′ | t1]]d′ , . . . , [[θ′ | tm]]d′ ]〉.
Here, d′ = d + n and θ′ is the function θ extended so that for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, θ′ maps
xi to d+ i. The structure that results from such a computation is a recursive structure
based on the pairing of an integer with a list (possibly empty) of such structures. The
result of computing [[θ0 | t]]0 on the five λ-terms in Figure 15 yields
〈0, []〉, 〈0, []〉, 〈1, [〈0, []〉]〉, 〈0, [〈0, [〈2, []〉]〉]〉, and 〈0, [〈0, [〈2, []〉]〉]〉.
Note that the first two and last two structures are identical. Since the input λ-terms




type apply int -> list deb -> deb.
type lc int -> deb -> cert.
type args int -> list deb -> cert.
type idx int -> index.
arr_jc (lc C D) (lc C D).
storeR_jc (lc C D) (lc C D).
releaseR_je (lc C D) (lc C D).
storeL_jc (lc C D) (lc C’ D) (idx C) :- C’ is C + 1.
decideL_je (lc C (apply H A)) (args C A) (idx V) :- V is C - H - 1.
initialL_je (args C []).
arr_je (args C (A::As)) (lc C A) (args C As).
Fig. 16 The FPC definition of the proof evidence of simply typed η-long β-normal λ-terms.
Figure 16 provides an FPC definition of η-long β-normal terms as proof evidence
for this propositional intuitionistic logic. Note that the type deb captures the nested
structure we have just described (the constructor apply corresponds to pairing in the
definition of [[· | ·]] above). Certificates—inhabitants of the cert type—are built using
the two constructors lc and args. In this FPC, all atomic formulas are given negative
polarity and the indexing structure is used to associate level counts (needed to compute
offsets) with assumed (stored) formulas. When providing names for clerks and experts
in this figure, we have used arr to denote implication, and we have used _j in all names
to signify that they belong to an intuitionistic logic proof system.
Formally speaking, let t be a λ-term in η-long β-normal form with simple type τ .
Let D be the term [[θ0 | t]]0 and let B be the intuitionistic formula that results from
replacing → with ⊃ and the primitive types with atomic formulas. Then it must be
the case that the sequent
(lc 0 D) : · ⇑· ` B ⇑ ·
is provable in the LJFa proof system. It is also easy to see that this check is, in fact, a
decision procedure since the certificate associated to sequents gets smaller as we move
from one phase to the next.
It is important to realize, however, that the converse of the statement above does
not hold. That is, it is possible for the sequent (lc 0 D) : ·⇑· ` B⇑· to be provable even
when D does not encode a simply typed λ-term of a type that corresponds to B. For
example, if B is t (the true constant), then this sequent is always provable even if D
is, say, 〈0, [〈0, []〉]〉, a term that encodes the self application λx(x x). The focus of this
FPC is the theorem-hood of a formula and not the structure of λ-terms. While that
structure might be used to guide the proof of a formula, this FPC may not actually
analyze the full structure of that term. Using techniques described in Section 9, it is
certainly possible to design an FPC that can validate a statement such as “t is a typed
term of type τ” instead of the statement “B is an intuitionistic formula”.
8.4 Variation on certificates based on de Bruijn indexes
A common representation of λ-terms based on de Bruijn indexes contains more informa-
tion than the certificate structures presented above: in particular, the exact placements
of λ’s within a term are usually part of the syntax (as in Figure 15). What if one wants
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to require more of the structure of the λ-term to be encoded within a certificate and
checked? Since the occurrences of λ in terms based on de Bruijn indexes corresponds
to the right-introduction of implication and since the certificate does not need to be
consulted during the asynchronous phase, we will assume that a properly polarized
formula forces a polarity shift by placing a positive delay (
∂
(·)) around all positive
occurrences of implication. This positive delay can be seen as either a new construc-
tor of polarized formulas or it can be defined by, say,
∂
(B) = B ∧+ t+. The formula
∂
(B) is positive no matter what the polarity of B is. We also introduce an additional
constructor
type lambda deb -> deb.
for encoding such extended term structures. We also need to add one new clause to
handle the new structure of certificate terms.
storeR_jc (lc C (lambda D)) (lc C (lambda D)).
decideR_je (lc C (lambda D)) (lc C (lambda D)).
andPos_je (lc C (lambda D)) (lc C D) (lc C (lambda D)).
true_je (lc C D).
It is also possible to accommodate simply typed λ-terms that are not in η-long
β-normal form. In order to handle the lack of β-normal forms, the cut inference rule
is needed and to handle the lack of η-long forms, it is necessary to check that B ` B
holds for non-atomic formulas. We now present the mimic FPC which can be used for
this purpose.
8.5 The mimic FPC
One way to prove the (unfocused) sequent B ` B′ is to check if B and B′ are, in fact,
equal as formulas. In that case, this sequent is provable using Gentzen’s initial rule.
In our focused proof systems, however, the initial rule can be used only for atomic
formulas. We present an FPC that will prove this sequent whenever B and B′ are
equal. To see how this FPC can be organized, consider proving the fact that restricting
initial rules to only be atomic initial rules (i.e., instances of the initial rule in which the
formula on the right is atomic and is present on the left) does not lose completeness.
The proof of this theorem proceeds by induction on the structure of formulas and with
proof figures such as
B ` B C ` C
B ⊃ C,B ` C
B ⊃ C ` B ⊃ C
and
B ` B C ` C
B,C ` B ∧ C
B ∧ C ` B ∧ C .
Showing the completeness of atomic initials is significantly simpler using Gentzen’s
original LJ proof system than it is using the focused LJF system directly. As these two
displayed derivations show, we simply need to pair a left and right introduction rule
together in order to make the formulas involved in an initial rule smaller. In a focused
proof system, however, a number of introduction rules of one phase (say, ⊃-right, ∨+-
left then ∧−-right) are done together before the corresponding rules (⊃-left, ∨+-right
then ∧−-left) can be done. The clerks must record the steps taken in the asynchronous
phase so that the experts can follow those steps.
More formally, the mimic FPC deals with sequents of the following form Γ ⇑ F `
F ⇑ . Depending on the polarity of F , one of the two occurrences will be immediately
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type root index.
type mL, mR index -> index.
type mimic index -> cert.
type aphaseL index -> list index -> list index -> index -> cert.
type aphaseR index -> list index -> index -> cert.
type sphaseL list index -> index -> index -> cert.
type sphaseR list index -> index -> cert.
arr_jc (mimic I) (aphaseL I [] [I] I).
decideL_je (aphaseR I Cs X) (sphaseL Cs I X) I.
decideR_je (aphaseR I Cs I) (sphaseR Cs I).
storeL_jc (aphaseL Rt Cs [I,J|R] X) (aphaseL Rt Cs [J|R] X) I.
storeL_jc (aphaseL Rt Cs [I] X) (aphaseR Rt Cs X) I.
storeR_jc (aphaseR Rt Cs X) (aphaseR Rt Cs X).
initialL_je (sphaseL _ I I).
initialR_je (sphaseR _ I) I.
releaseL_je (sphaseL _ I X) (aphaseL I [] [I] X).
releaseR_je (sphaseR _ I) (aphaseR I [] I).
arr_jc (aphaseR Rt Cs I) (aphaseL Rt Cs [mL I] (mR I)).
andNeg_jc (aphaseR Rt Cs I) (aphaseR Rt [mL I|Cs] (mL I))
(aphaseR Rt [mR I|Cs] (mR I)).
andPos_jc (aphaseL Rt Cs [I|R] X) (aphaseL Rt Cs [mL I, mR I|R] X).
true_jc (aphaseL Rt Cs [I,J|R] X) (aphaseL Rt Cs [J|R] X).
true_jc (aphaseL Rt Cs [I] X) (aphaseR Rt Cs X).
or_jc (aphaseL Rt Cs [I|R] X) (aphaseL Rt [mL I|Cs] [mL I|R] X)
(aphaseL Rt [mR I|Cs] [mR I|R] X).
arr_je (sphaseL Cs I X) (sphaseR Cs (mL I)) (sphaseL Cs (mR I) X).
andPos_je (sphaseR Cs I) (sphaseR Cs (mL I)) (sphaseR Cs (mR I)).
true_je (sphaseR Cs I).
or_je (sphaseR Cs I) (sphaseR Cs’ (mL I)) left &
andNeg_je (sphaseL Cs I X) (sphaseL Cs’ (mL I) X) left :-
memb_and_rest (mL I) Cs Cs ’.
or_je (sphaseR Cs I) (sphaseR Cs’ (mR I)) right &
andNeg_je (sphaseL Cs I X) (sphaseL Cs’ (mR I) X) right :-
memb_and_rest (mR I) Cs Cs ’.
Fig. 17 The mimic FPC for intuitionistic logic
stored (call it the mirror F ). As said before, the output (in terms of sequents) of an
asynchronous phase is uniquely determined by its input sequent. These sequents will be
of the form Γ, F1, .., Fn⇑ ` ⇑F ′ where Fi are negative or atomic subformulas of F , F ′ is
a positive or atomic subformula of F , and where exactly one of these subformulas is the
mirror F which was stored at the beginning of this asynchronous phase. The derivation
then continues with a decide rule on this mirror F , and then introduces exactly the
same connectives as the previous phase and ends at the same subformulas, either with
an init rule (if the subformulas are atomic) or a release rule (if the subformulas are
not atomic). Indeed, one notices that if a formula can be subject to a store rule on the
left (resp. the right) then that same formula is subject to a release or init rule if it
appears on the right (resp. the left). Furthermore, a formula that can be subject to a
release on the left (resp. the right) can be subject to a decide rule on the right (resp.
the left). This appears clearly when one examines the behavior of the release experts
of Figure 17, recording the current index I as the first parameter of the aphaseL and
aphaseR cert constructors, and the behavior of the decide experts using precisely that
parameter to start the focused phase.
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9 Checking proofs instead of provability
In the previous sections, we placed primary concern on checking whether or not a
certain formula is a theorem (of intuitionistic or classical logic). Proof evidence was
used to guide the proof checking and proof reconstruction steps. In the end, when the
checker has successfully executed a given FPC over a given proof certificate, the only
guarantee our kernel provides is that the formula is, in fact, a theorem. The kernel, in
and of itself, does not guarantee any other properties about certificates.
In this section, we illustrate that it is possible to write FPCs that succeed only if
the proof evidence it contains satisfies certain strong structural restrictions.
9.1 Justified Horn clause proofs
By Horn clause, we shall mean a closed formula of the form
∀x1 . . .∀xm(A1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ An ⊃ A0) (m ≥ 0, n ≥ 0)
where A0, . . . , An are atomic formulas. If m is 0, we do not write any universal quan-
tifiers and if n is 0, we write no implications. Thus, if m = n = 0 then the displayed
Horn clause is a (closed) atomic formula. By a Horn clause entailment we shall mean a
formula of the form H1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Hn ⊃ A where A is an atomic formula and H1, . . . , Hn
(n ≥ 1) are Horn clauses.
We now wish to introduce a simple proof structure, which we called here a justified
Horn clause proof. We first illustrate this kind of proof with an example.
Example 3 Considered the following sequence of indexed Horn clauses that describes
the adjacency graph of a simple graph and defines the relationship of path within that
graph.
(1) adj a b.
(2) adj b a.
(3) adj a c.
(4) adj c d.
(5) ∀x∀y(adj x y ⊃ path x y).
(6) ∀x∀y∀z(path x y ⊃ path y z ⊃ path x z).
A consequence of these Horn clauses is the atom (path a d); that is, the Horn clause
entailment (1) ⊃ . . . ⊃ (6) ⊃ path a d is a theorem of classical (and intuitionistic)
logic. Given that the underlying graph has a cycle and that the construction of paths
is associative, there are a number of proofs of this entailment. The following sequence
of triples, containing a label, an atomic formula and a justification is an example of a
justified Horn clause proof.
(7) path a b 〈5, [1]〉 (11) path a c 〈6, [9, 10]〉
(8) path b a 〈5, [2]〉 (12) path c d 〈5, [4]〉
(9) path a a 〈6, [7, 8]〉 (13) path a d 〈6, [11, 12]〉
(10) path a c 〈5, [3]〉
In order to formally define what we mean by justified Horn clause proofs, we will
use the machinery of FPCs (polarization, clerks, and experts). We must first define the
syntax of intuitionistic formulas used to form Horn clauses. For this, we shall use the
kind and type declarations
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kind just type.
type tup index -> iform -> index -> list index -> just.
type i int -> index.
type terminal index.
type load list index -> list just -> cert.
type jlist list just -> cert.
type apply index -> list index -> cert.
type args list index -> cert.
type finish index -> cert.
type initL , done cert.
Fig. 18 The constants used by the FPC for checking justified Horn clause proofs
kind iform , i type.
type imp iform -> iform -> iform.
type forall (i -> iform) -> iform.
Here, formulas will have the type iform and first-order quantifiers range over the type
i. The predicates denoting adequacy and path are declared the following type.
type adj , path i -> i -> iform.
Next consider the constructors declared in Figure 18. Clearly, indexes are either based
on numbers (as in Example 3) or are equal to the internally used index terminal. The
type just represent the individual steps of a justified proof: thus, the proof evidence
in Example 3 can be written as the following term of type (list just):
[ tup (i 7) (path a b) (i 5) [i 1],
tup (i 8) (path b a) (i 5) [i 2],
tup (i 9) (path a a) (i 6) [i 7, i 8],
tup (i 10) (path a c) (i 5) [i 3],
tup (i 11) (path a c) (i 6) [i 9, i 10],
tup (i 12) (path c d) (i 5) [i 4],
tup (i 13) (path a d) (i 6) [i 11, i 12] ].
There are six constructors for building certificates and these will correspond to six
different parts of the proof reconstruction process that happens during checking of this
proof. We describe each of these different constructors and their roles separately.
The load constructor. Since the theorems that we are attempting to prove have the
form H1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Hn ⊃ A, the asynchronous phase is a series of n alternations of ⊃r
and Sl rules, such as those displayed here:
Γ,H ⇑ ` G ⇑
Γ ⇑H ` G ⇑ Sl
Γ ⇑ ` H ⊃ G ⇑ ⊃r
The term guiding this part of the proof construction has the form (load Is Js) where
Is is a list of the indexes to be assigned (by the store_jc clerk) to the Horn clause
assumptions. In our example above, this list is
[i 1, i 2, i 3, i 4, i 5, i 6]
Notice that the only clerk and expert predicates defined for the constructor load are
arr_jc, storeL_jc, and (when the list of indexes is exhausted) storeR_jc.
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arr_jc (load (I::Tlabs) Justs) (load (I::Tlabs) Justs).
storeL_jc (load (I::Tlabs) Justs) (load Tlabs Justs) I.
storeR_jc (load nil Justs) (jlist Justs).
cut_je (jlist (tup I Atom Rule Premises :: Justs))
(apply Rule Premises)
(jlist (tup I Atom Rule Premises ::Justs ))
(p Atom).
storeL_jc (jlist (tup I Atom Rule Premises ::Justs ))
(jlist Justs) I.
decideR_je (jlist nil) done.
initialR_je done I.
storeR_jc (apply Rule Premises) (apply Rule Premises ).
decideL_je (apply Rule Premises) (args Premises) Rule.
all_je (args Premises) (args Premises) T.
arr_je (args (P:: Premises )) (finish P) (args Premises ).
releaseL_je (args nil) initL.
storeL_jc initL initL terminal.
decideR_je initL initL.
initialR_je initL terminal.
initialR_je (finish P) P.
Fig. 19 The clerks and experts used for defining justified Horn clause proofs
The jlist constructor. This constructor is used to build a sequent of cut rules, one
for each of the justifications in the list that is the argument of the jlist constructor.
In particular, when this constructor is paired with a non-empty set of justifications,
then the cut_je expert and the storeL_jc clerk are defined and are responsible for
building proofs of the following form.
Π1
Γ ⇑ ` B ⇑
Π2
Γ,B ⇑ ` ⇑A
Γ ⇑B ` ⇑A Sl
Γ ⇑ ` ⇑A Cut
The proof Π1 is constructed (as described below) by applying a Horn clause to some
atomic formulas. The proof Π2 accumulates that formula B as a new assumption
and then continues to insert cuts as long as there are justifications (arguments to the
jlist constructor). Notice that the conclusion of this derivation is the same as the
conclusion of the subproof Π2 except that the atomic formula B is added to the left-
hand context. When there are no more justifications remaining, the decideR_je expert
shifts the certificate term to done and the only clerk or expert that can be used with
that constructor is the initialR_je expert. If that instance of the initial rule succeeds,
the formula stored on the right (A in the clauses illustrated above) must also be on
the left: that is, A was either one of the original assumptions or it was inserted by a
previous cut rule.
The apply, args, and finish constructors. These three constructors are used to build
the proofs that arise on the left premise of the cut rule above (the proof labeled Π1
above). By way of example, consider the proof in Figure 20 that the formula labeled by
(9) (i.e., path a a) follows from transitivity of the path predicate (the formula labeled
(6)) and formulas labeled (7) and (8).
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Γ ` path a b ⇓ Ir
Γ ` path b a ⇓ Ir
Γ, path a a ` path a a ⇓ Ir
Γ, path a a ⇑ ` ⇑ path a a Dr
Γ ⇑ path a a ` ⇑ path a a Sl
Γ ⇓ path a a ` path a a Rl
Γ ⇓ path b a ⊃ path a a ` path a a ⊃l
Γ ⇓ path a b ⊃ path b a ⊃ path a a ` path a a ⊃l
Γ ⇓ ∀x∀y∀z.path x y ⊃ path y z ⊃ path x z ` path a a ∀r × 3
Γ ⇑ ` ⇑ path a a Dl
Γ ⇑ ` path a a ⇑ Sr
Fig. 20 A focused proof about paths
Note that the two initial rules on the left of this proof are guided by the terms
(finish (i 7)) and (finish (i 8)), respectively. Since these terms explicitly men-
tion certain indexes, the premises to the transitivity axiom cannot be just any two
path-atoms that precede the current one in the proof but must be the specific ones
labeled by the indexes. Thus, this FPC is not just checking that a particular formula
is provable, it is also controlling many of the fine points in how it is proved.
9.2 Frege proofs
The example of checking justified Horn clause proofs was introduced in the previous
section in order to make the checking of Frege proofs immediate. A Frege proof in
propositional logic is a list of formulas such that every element of that list is either the
instance of an axiom schema or is the result of an inference rule applied to one or more
formulas that appear before it in that list.
By way of example, consider the following three axiom schemas for propositional
classical logic.
(1) X ⊃ Y ⊃ X
(2) ((X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)) ⊃ ((X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (X ⊃ Z))))
(3) (((X ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ X))
Together with the rule of modus ponens, we have a Frege proof of the formula (⊥ ⊃ w)
(taken from [54]).
(4) ((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ w by (3)
(5) (((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ w) ⊃ (⊥ ⊃ (((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ w)) by (1)
(6) ⊥ ⊃ (((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ w) by mp (4), (5)
(7) (⊥ ⊃ (((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ w)) ⊃ ((⊥ ⊃ ((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥)) ⊃ (⊥ ⊃ w)) by (2)
(8) (⊥ ⊃ ((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥)) ⊃ (⊥ ⊃ w) by mp (6), (7)
(9) ⊥ ⊃ ((w ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) by (1)
(10) ⊥ ⊃ w by mp (9), (8)
We can easily check the claim that these displayed formulas are a Frege proof by
first encoding this problem into one of checking justified Horn clauses. To do this, we
use the following declaration.
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type v, w i. % Two propositional variables
type bot i. % classical false
type ar i -> i -> i. % classical implication
infix ar 4.
type pv i -> iform. % Provability predicate
Given these types and typed constructors, we can then form the following Horn
clause entailment.
(( forall X\ forall Y\ (pv X) imp (pv (X ar Y)) imp (pv Y)) imp
(( forall X\ forall Y\ pv (X ar (Y ar X))) imp
(( forall X\ forall Y\ forall Z\ pv ((X ar (Y ar Z)) ar
((X ar Y) ar (X ar Z)))) imp
(( forall X\ pv (((X ar bot) ar bot) ar X)) imp
pv (bot ar w)))))
The predicate pv denotes the property that its argument (an encoding of a propositional
classical logic formula) is provable. The first assumption of this entailment encodes
modus ponens and the other three assumptions encode the three axiom schemas. Given
this rather natural encoding of this problem, the Frege proof claimed above can be
directly encoded as the following list of justifications.
[ tup (i 4) (pv (((w ar bot) ar bot) ar w)) (i 3) [],
tup (i 5) (pv ((((w ar bot) ar bot) ar w) ar
(bot ar (((w ar bot) ar bot) ar w)))) (i 1) [],
tup (i 6) (pv (bot ar (((w ar bot) ar bot) ar w))) (i 0) [i 4,i 5],
tup (i 7) (pv ((bot ar (((w ar bot) ar bot) ar w)) ar
((bot ar ((w ar bot) ar bot)) ar (bot ar w))))
(i 2) [],
tup (i 8) (pv ((bot ar ((w ar bot) ar bot)) ar (bot ar w)))
(i 0) [i 6,i 7],
tup (i 9) (pv (bot ar ((w ar bot) ar bot ))) (i 1) [],
tup (i 10) (pv (bot ar w)) (i 0) [i 9,i 8] ].
As is required by the FPC for checking justified Horn clause proofs, the polarity bias
for the pv predicate must be positive.
Using such an encoding, we have illustrated how checking Frege proofs can be
reduced to the checking of justified Horn clause entailments. It would be easy to change
the object-level logic from classical propositional logic to, say, a modal logic and its
associated Frege proof rules.
10 Hosting LKF a on an LJF a kernel
The semantic definition of proof evidence starts with first identifying which logic—
intuitionistic or classical—to use to interpret that evidence. Depending on that choice,
a different set of polarization choices and a different choice of clerks and experts are
involved. The syntactic details behind these two logics are, however, remarkably simi-
lar. For example, Gentzen’s original unfocused sequent calculus for classical (LK) and
intuitionistic (LJ) logics used the same technical devices (contexts, two-sided sequents,
structural rules, eigenvariables, etc) and separated LJ proofs from LK proofs by one
simple restriction (“at most one formula on the right”). Similarly, Liang and Miller
[61] have shown how focused classical and intuitionistic (and linear logic) proofs can be
seen as restrictions of a common focusing framework. Since classical and intuitionistic
proofs share a great deal in common, it is natural to ask whether we could use the
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kernel for one of these logics to check proof evidence for the other logic: in this way,
one would only need to build (and trust) one kernel instead of two.
Various relationships between classical and intuitionistic provability and proofs are
well known. The double negation translations of, say, Go¨del [44], Gentzen [40], and
Kolmogorov [58] can map classical logic provability directly into intuitionistic logic.
On the other hand, translations of intuitionistic logic into classical logic all seem to
use additional devices, not in propositional or first-order classical logics. For example,
intuitionistic provability has been encoded by Go¨del using classical, modal logic [45]
and by Girard [41] using linear logic and the ! exponential. In fact, Gentzen’s single-
conclusion restriction for intuitionistic sequent can easily be seen as adding a kind
of exponential in the sense of linear logic. In particular, since the right-hand side
of LJ sequents cannot have commas, the right-hand side is a linear context while
the left-hand side is classical (i.e., allows contractions). At the same time, the single-
conclusion restriction enforces another distinction between these two contexts that
must be encoded into the implication. Consider, for example, the LK inference rule
Γ1 −→ A,∆1 Γ2, B −→ ∆2
Γ1, Γ2, A ⊃ B −→ ∆1,∆2 ⊃ L
If we impose the LJ restriction here, then it must be the case that ∆1 is empty. This
same “modal” distinction between formulas on the left and right of the sequent arrow
is captured by the linear logic exponential. In particular, if the left premise of the
inference figure
!Γ1 ` !A,∆1 !Γ2 ` B,∆2
!Γ1, !Γ2 ` !A⊗B,∆1,∆2
is the introduction rule for ! then, again, ∆1 must be empty.
Since it appears that the classical logic proofs (without modal-like or exponential-
like operators) are less expressive than intuitionistic logic proofs, it is then natural to
try to use a kernel for intuitionistic logic as the heart of a kernel for classical logic. Given
our approach to proof checking—which includes proof reconstruction—our kernels need
to follow proof evidence to successful conclusions but we must also follow unsuccessful
attempts at proof. We need to require that no matter how we polarize classical logic
formulas, we can translate the resulting polarized formulas into polarized intuitionistic
formulas so that phases in LKF are in one-to-one correspondence with phases in LJF
of the translated formulas. For example, if we know that there is a small proof of a
given sequent in LKF (say, involving a couple of decide rules), then we need to know
that there must also be a similarly small proof of the translated sequent in LJF.
We shall not directly use double negation translations since these are usually pre-
sented for unpolarized classical logic formulas. Instead, we shall use a translation intro-
duced by Chaudhuri [11] for encoding LKF formulas and proofs into LJF formulas and
proofs. The two mappings, J·K+ and J·K-, defined in Figure 21 describe two mappings
of LKF formulas to LJF formulas. Here, q is a fixed, negative atom that is not allowed
in the input LKF formulas. All other atoms in the target LJF formula are assigned
positive polarity even if it is the result of encoding a negative LKF atom. The output
of both J·K+ and J·K- are either a positive formula or a formula of the form B ⊃ q for
some positive formula B. We will subsequently call these functions collectively the J·K±
translation.
It is proved in [11, Theorem 12] that phases in LKF are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with phases in LJF when the J·K± is used. More precisely, [11] shows that an
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Jt+K+ = t Jt−K- = fJf+K+ = f Jf−K- = tJB ∨+ CK+ = JBK+ ∨ JCK+ JB ∨− CK- = JBK- ∧+ JCK-JB ∧+ CK+ = JBK+ ∧+ JCK+ JB ∧− CK- = JBK- ∨ JCK-J∃x.AK+ = ∃x.JAK+ J∀x.AK- = ∃x.JAK-JA+K+ = A+ JA−K- = A+JNK+ = JNK- ⊃ q JP K- = JP K+ ⊃ q
Fig. 21 The functions J·K+ and J·K- which map LKF formulas onto LJF formulas.
type fcert cert.
andPos_jc C C’ :- orNeg_kc C C’.
andPos_je C C’ C’’ :- andPos_ke C C’ C’’.
decideL_je C C’ I :- decide_ke C C’ I.
initialR_je C I :- initial_ke C I.
or_jc C C’ C’’ :- andNeg_kc C C’ C’’.
or_je C C’ Choice :- orPos_ke C C’ Choice.
releaseR_je C C’ :- release_ke C C’.
some_jc C C’ :- all_kc C C’ .
some_je C C’ T :- some_ke C C’ T.
storeL_jc C C’ I :- store_kc C C’ I.
true_jc C C’ :- false_kc C C’.
true_je C :- true_ke C.
arr_jc C C.
storeR_jc C C.
arr_je C C fcert.
initialL_je fcert.
Fig. 22 The definition of LJF clerks and experts based on those given for LKF
LKF-phase ending with the sequent ` Θ ⇑Γ corresponds to an LJF-phase ending with
the sequent JΘK- ⇑ JΓ K- ` q ⇑ and that an LKF-phase ending with the sequent ` Θ ⇓B
corresponds to an LJF-phase ending with the sequent JΘK- ⇓ JBK- ` q .
We can make the following additional statements about the translation of LKF
proofs into LJF.
1. Formally, the zones in the sequents of the focused calculi in [11] are multisets. In
our setting, the asynchronous zones Γ in both the classical sequent ` Θ ⇑ Γ and
the intuitionistic sequent Θ⇑Γ ` q ⇑ are lists. The correspondence of phases is still
maintained given this change.
2. The storer rule is only applied to the atom q.
Given these observations, it is possible to refine Chaudhuri’s theorem to fit our purposes
here: we can actually show a precise translation of each LKF rule into a small group of
LJF rules. This makes it possible to define the clerks and experts needed for guiding
the LJF kernel directly from clerks and experts destined for the LKF kernel. In fact,
a precise way to show this correspondence on proofs is to show the implementation of
this definition, given in Figure 22. Note also that indexes used for storing and deciding
on formulas in the LKF setting can be used, unchanged, for the same purposes in the
LJF setting.
We left the cut-rule and its associated expert from the presentation above since
it is the only case where something more subtle needs to be done. First the mapping
of formulas and proofs from Chaudhuri needs to be extended slightly to account for
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Ξ1 ` Θ ⇑N Ξ2 ` Θ ⇑ ¬N cute(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2, N)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ ·
Ξ1 ` Θ ⇑ P Ξ2 ` Θ ⇑ ¬P cute(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2, P )
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ ·
Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ ` J¬NK- ⇑ Ξ2 : Γ ⇑ J¬NK- ` ⇑R cute(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2, J¬NK-)
Ξ : Γ ⇑ ` ⇑R
Ξ2 : Γ ⇑ ` JP K- ⇑ Ξ1 : Γ ⇑ JP K- ` ⇑R cute(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2, JP K-)
Ξ : Γ ⇑ ` ⇑R
Fig. 23 Various instances of the augmented LJFa cut rule
proofs with the cut-inference rule. Second, the exact way that the LJF cut expert calls
the LKF cut expert depends on the polarity of the formula returned by the LKF cut
expert. However, given the two different instances of the cut-rule in LKFa in Figure 23,
it is an easy matter to see how the cut-experts for LJFa must be defined. That formal
definition is given by the clause
cut_je C C1 C2 F :- cut_ke C C1 C2 D,
(isNeg D, negate D P, trans- P F;
isPos D, trans- D F).
Here, we assume that the predicate trans- and negate are defined so that trans- F F’
holds if and only if F ′ = JF K- and negate F F’ holds if and only if F ′ is the negation
normal form of the negation of F .
11 A reference proof certificate checker
In this section, we outlined how the logic programming paradigm can be used to im-
plement FPCs. Such implementations are best referred to as reference checkers and
not as an implementation of a universal proof checker since the effective implementa-
tion of such a broad-spectrum checker for all possible FPCs is unlikely. The relation
between FPC specification and proof checker implementation is probably similar to
the relationship between the specification of a context-free grammar (CFG) and the
implementation of a parser (returning to an analogy offered in Section 1). Following
the introduction of CFGs as a framework for describing the structure of a concrete lan-
guage [21], a great deal of additional study was needed before CFGs could be used to
provide practical tools for routine use by computer scientists. For example, such gram-
mars needed to be analyzed in order to discover (1) that determining whether or not
a grammar is ambiguous is undecidable; (2) that deterministic and non-deterministic
CFGs have different expressive strengths; and (3) that practical parsing required se-
rious restriction (such as those related to LALR parsing). Similar developments also
need to be considered for the FPC framework.
Another analogy between CFG and FPC that is worth pointing out here is the
role that the logic programming paradigm can play. Logic programs provide natural
means of getting parsers from grammars [75,84] (even though serious parsers implement
greatly restricted subsets of CFG with rather specialized tools, such a YACC [56]). It
is also the case, as we discuss below, that moving from an FPC specification to a naive
logic programming implementation of a checker is straightforward.
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Techniques for turning a proof system into a logic program that captures provability
has been known for a long time [35,66]. Prolog-style, depth-first search is too naive to
turn such specifications into useful theorem provers. In the setting of proof checking,
however, certificates usually contain information that can provide meaningful bounds
to restrict depth-first search. One might thus expect that bounded depth-first search
implementations of the augmented proof systems LKFa and LJFa might provide useful
implementations of proof checkers. We describe below a reference proof checker we have
written in λProlog that has been used to validate all the example FPCs in this paper.
11.1 Kernels as logic programs
As we mentioned in Section 5, a kernel is an implementation of an augmented focused
systems, such as LKFa or LJFa. While we have specified these kernels as collections
of inference rules (in Figures 6 and 14), these could have been equally well written as
clauses within the λProlog programming language. To be more concrete, we illustrate
just such an encoding for LKFa.
The two styles of sequents used in LKF are of the form ` Θ ⇑ Γ and ` Θ ⇓ B.
When we move to LKFa, the members of Θ are pairs of formula and index. Our logic
programming specification of the association Θ will make use of the λProlog’s ability to
perform hypothetical reasoning: that is, the association between indexes and formulas
will be made by sets of assumptions of the form storage I C, where I is an index
and C is a formula. On the other hand, the Γ context will be represented by a list of
formulas. By introducing the declarations
kind seq type.
type unf list form -> seq.
type foc form -> seq.
type storage index -> form -> o.
we can then encode the LKFa sequent ` Θ ⇓ B as the term (foc B) and ` Θ ⇑ Γ as
the term (unf Gamma): here, B encodes the formula B and Gamma encodes the list of
formulas in Γ . Of course, one must look to the set of assumptions to determine the
value of (the now implicit) Θ context.
Given this encoding of an LKFa sequent, the checking process can be encoded
directly as a recursive λProlog program that axiomatizes the predicate
type check cert -> seq -> o.
that is meant to determine whether or not a given certificate term leads to a proof of
the given formula. For example, the implementation of the two inference rules from
Figure 6 for introducing the negative polarized disjunction and conjunction can be
written as follows.
check Cert (unf [A !-! B|Rest]) :- orNeg_kc Cert Cert ’,
check Cert ’ (unf [A, B|Rest ]).
check Cert (unf [A &-& B|Rest]) :- andNeg_kc Cert CertA CertB ,
check CertA (unf [A|Rest]), check CertB (unf [B|Rest ]).
Here, the symbols !-! and &-& denote the internal names for the negatively polarized
disjunction and conjunction (these are local to just the kernel code). Similarly, two
inference rules that use the storage of formulas—store and decide—can be implemented
simply as follows.
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check Cert (unf [C|Rest]) :- (isPos C ; isNegAtm C),
store_kc Cert Cert ’ I, (storage I C => check Cert ’ (unf Rest )).
check Cert (unf nil) :- decide_ke Cert Cert ’ I, storage I P,
isPos P, check Cert ’ (foc P).
Note the use of the hypothetical implication in the body of the first clause.
In this manner, a λProlog specification of an LKFa kernel can be a short program,
consisting of one clause for every inference rule in LKFa plus code to define predicates
such as isPos, isNeg, isNegAtom, etc.
All along, we have been presenting the specification of clerks and experts as logic
programs. In general, the logical structure of such specifications are rather simple:
for example, the clerks and experts for deciding conjunctive normal forms (Figure 7),
for checking oracle strings (Figure 8), and for checking justified Horn clauses proofs
(Figure 19) are all given as (universally quantified) atomic Horn clauses. Even the other
specifications of clerks and experts—for binary resolution (Section 7.3), βη-long type
checking (Figure 16), the mimic decision procedure (Figure 17)—are almost all atomic
specifications with an occasional clause having a simple body.
11.2 Implementations of checkers
Although proof checking has a long tradition, that tradition has most frequently been
based on functional programming language implementations and denotational semantic
specification techniques. There are, however, a number of reasons for preferring the logic
programming paradigm over the functional programming paradigm [65]. In addition
to the benefits of using λProlog given above (availability of hypothetical reasoning)
and in Section 6 (availability of typing, relational specifications, and λ-tree syntax) to
present FPCs, we also state the following additional benefits of using λProlog for the
construction of proof checking kernels.
1. As with all logic programming languages, λProlog implements unification and back-
tracking search, both of which are useful for proof reconstruction.
2. One of the benefits of using the λ-tree syntax [66] approach to syntax with bindings,
is that it incorporates logically supported mechanisms for eigenvariables, even in
the presence of unification. As a result, full support for alternating quantification
within formulas being checked is allowed: prenex normal forms and skolemization
are not needed.
3. The logic underlying λProlog also provides for not only modular construction of
programs but also the ability to hide constructors and clauses (in the sense of
abstract datatypes). Thus, a kernel can be largely isolated from other programs
that may invoke it and this makes it much easier to reason about the correctness
of the resulting kernel implementations.
While these features are useful and provide a flexible framework in which to design,
test, and execute proof checkers based on FPCs, not all these features are needed for
all proof checking efforts. While modularity and typing are useful for the usual reasons,
they are not strictly necessary for building checkers. Similarly, if one is interested only in
checking proofs in propositional logic, then the support for λ-tree syntax is not needed.
Finally, the association between indexes and formulas within sequent contexts can also
be managed by explicit structures, such as association lists, instead of implicitly using
hypothetical reasoning. Hence, it is easy to modify everything presented here so that
Prolog (not λProlog) could be used to interpret FPCs over propositional logic.
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The one feature of logic programming that would seem the most difficult to elim-
inate completely is the availability of unification and backtracking search: these two
features made it possible for several of our certificates to not contain explicit term
structures. If one is willing, however, to work with certificate formats that provide a
lot of explicit information, doing without these two features is possible. For example, it
is possible to extend the FPC for justified Horn clauses (Figure 19) so that justification
contain a list of terms to be used to instantiate the universal quantifiers surrounding a
Horn clause under focus. By using such a justification, unification is no longer needed
for checking such certificates. Removing unification in this way means, of course, that
the certificates for justified Horn clauses (and, similarly, Frege proofs) are significantly
larger.
Similarly, an implementation of full hypothetical reasoning (as it is implemented
in, for example, Teyjus [71,80]) is not necessary since it is only used in the kernel to
store atomic formulas of the form (storage I L) where L is a literal and I is an in-
dex. Since indexes can be very specific structures in some applications (e.g., integers,
tokens, and formula occurrences), a more effective implementation of storing and re-
calling atomic formulas can be done by replacing the usual “first-argument-indexing”
technique employed by many logic programming implementations with specialized in-
dexing techniques.
Since kernels must be trusted, the fact that we can write them as small, declarative
programs has given us a great deal of trust in the kernels we have implemented. We
do, of course, have to trust as well the Teyjus implementation to provide a sound
implementation of logic. Fortunately, since the elements of λProlog that we use here
are all based on intuitionistic logic with quantification over simply typed λ-terms, other
implementations of that logic exist and still others can be built as desired. For example,
there is the ELPI implementation of λProlog [31] and both the Minlog prover [83] and
Isabelle/Pure [74] implement much of that logic.
12 Future work
12.1 Developing more examples of FPCs
Many more proofs systems than those illustrated here can be defined as FPCs: see,
for example, the specification of FPCs for equational rewriting and paramodulation
[16,17]. The proof theoretic results about focused proof systems for modal logics in
[69] were designed in part to allow a natural approach to defining FPCs for labeled
proofs of modal logic formulas. A formal FPC definition of the dependently typed
λ-calculus—such as λΠ [6] and LF [48]—should be possible by first encoding such a
typed λ-calculus into intuitionistic logic [33,86] and then by generalizing the justified
Horn clause certificate format in Section 9 to a “justified hereditary Harrop formula”
certificate format. This typed λ-calculus has also recently been extended to LFSC [88]
and to LFP [52] so that various kinds of computations can be treated by the type
checker instead of being explicitly detailed within the typed λ-term itself. Formal FPC
definitions of such proofs should similarly be captured in our setting.
Developing a kernel for linear logic should be a rather straightforward exercise
given that focusing for linear logic is well understood [1]. In fact, our first attempt to
build kernels for classical and intuitionistic logics centered on first building a kernel for
the LKU system [61] that allows mixing linear logic, classical, and intuitionistic logic.
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Given the fact that a kernel for LJFa could also be used to power a kernel for LKFa
(Section 10), we did not need the additional flexibility offered by an LKU-based kernel.
12.2 Moving beyond first-order logic
In this paper, we have limited ourselves to first-order logic. An interesting and impor-
tant setting for developing FPCs are model checkers and inductive theorem provers.
The paper by Baelde [3] on adding least and greatest fixed point operators to linear
logic provides some of the proof theoretic foundations on which to start that effort.
Initial results on certifying model checking problems related to reachability and bisimu-
lation appear in [49] and initial designs for certifying inductive theorem proving appear
in [8].
While the sequent calculus proof systems are known and well studied for higher-
order versions of both classical and intuitionistic logics, there has not been much work
on general focusing systems for such logics. While focusing can be extended to higher-
order logic when a monolithic assignment of polarity is made upfront (all connectives
and atomic formulas are all negative or all positive) [25,34,67], more flexible polarity
assignments have not yet been studied explicitly.
12.3 Theories
In many situations, theorems are proved with respect to some theory. Set theory is
one such popular theory and provides the basis of the Mizar theorem prover. It is also
possible to view type theories and higher-order logic as theories in first-order logic [28,
29,33]. Proving theorems from theories can generally be encoded in logic by viewing
theories as additional assumptions. Thus, checking proofs in logic is an important first
step in dealing with consequences within theories. Many questions related to reasoning
with theories—such as how to related conclusions derived from different theories—are
not immediately treated by reference to an underlying logic and such questions will
require their own treatment at some point.
12.4 Extensions to the kernel design
Recognizing and treating parallelism in proof structures has been a recurrent theme
in proof theory: for examples, expansion trees [63] and proof nets [41] provide proof
systems that make a minimal commitment to the order in which inference rules are
applied. The notion of multifocusing—that is, the focusing on several positive formulas
at once instead of just one—has been introduced into the setting of focused proofs [68]
in order to capture such parallelism [12,13]. For a (single-focus) treatment of expansion
trees as an FPC, see [15, Section 5.4].
The following inference rule, called the multicut rule, is often used as a technical
generalization to the cut rule to help prove cut-elimination theorems (see, for example,
[39,85]).
∆1 −→ B1 · · · ∆n −→ Bn B1, . . . , Bn, Γ −→ C
∆1, . . . ,∆n, Γ −→ C mc (n ≥ 1)
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While this rule can be seen as encoding n separate applications of the cut-rule, this
rule states that the n-lemmas that are proved (the n left-most premises) were actually
proved separately from each other. Thus, if a proof relies on several lemmas that have
been proved independently of each other, their independence can be encoded using
a multicut. If such a multicut rule is not checked directly, the author of the proof
certificate might need to serialize the various cuts and thereby introduce spurious
dependences between the various lemmas and their assumptions.
Our kernels should also be extended so that previous proved theorems can be
used in establishing new theorems. It is easy to imagine a situation where libraries of
theorems are responsible for checking proof certificates and for making their theorems
available to other provers. Similarly, there might be situations where we simply wish
to trust some (special purpose) prover and that we check all other aspects of a proof:
current uses of SMT provers often follow this pattern. In any case, the kinds of kernels
we have described would need (simple) modifications so that they can relegate trust
to other computational systems.
13 Related work
The notion of having trusted kernels for checking proofs is a well established design
element of many theorem provers. For example, the LCF [47] family of provers, includ-
ing Coq [7], Isabelle [73], and the HOL provers [46], all separate kernels that need to
be trusted from more general proof search mechanisms that do not need to be trusted.
While theorem provers are often evolving programs in which complex implementation
of search algorithms and heuristics are tested and deployed, kernels are intended to
be small and largely static. As a result, one should be able to analyze a kernel and
have high-confidence that they will not be unsound. A theorem prover that contains a
trusted subsystem that checks alleged proofs is said to satisfy the de Bruijn criterion
[5]. In such a system, one only has to trust the correctness of the simpler checking
subsystem and not the large and complex theorem prover.
Most of the theorem provers that contain kernel subsystems do not generally pro-
vide their proofs in a format that can be exported, checked, and used by other systems.
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest and need to facilitate the sharing
of proofs. For example, the OpenTheory project [55] aims at having various HOL the-
orem provers share proofs. Still other projects attempt to connect SAT/SMT systems
with more general theorem provers, e.g., [2,10,36]. In order for prover A to not blindly
trust proofs from prover B, prover B may be required to generate a certificate that
demonstrates that it has formally found a proof. Prover A will then need to check
the correctness of that certificate. In this way, prover A only needs to check individ-
ual certificates and not rely on trusting the whole of prover B. For example, in [36],
an SMT prover was modified to output proof evidence as Isabelle proof scripts that
can be checked by Isabelle; similarly, in [2], a SAT/SMT prover is modified to output
proof evidence that can be checked within Coq. To the extent that such approaches are
ad hoc and technology-based, this kind of proof sharing can break every time a new
version of either prover A or B is released.
Several projects have arose to improve this situation and to provide more principled
and universal formats for sharing proof structures. Some specialized theorem provers
related to SAT solving have adopted standards for outputting their proof evidence
(see, for example, [38,91]). The dependently typed λ-calculus LF has been extended
43
to LFSC (the “Logical Framework with Side Conditions”) [88] for which a checker is
available. This checker has been used to check proofs emitted by two different SMT
provers [89]. The MMT proof tool [81] abstracts away from specific logics and allows
proof systems to be defined, analyzed, implemented, and checked, hence, allowing the
construction of proof checkers that are independent of specific theorem provers. The
Dedukti proof checking system [9,82] is based on a still richer logical framework, namely
λΠ modulo [24], that incorporates constructive and dependently typed λ-calculus plus
induction (arithmetic). Several implemented systems—in particular, Coq, HOL, Fo-
CaLize, Matita, iProver, and Zenon—have been augmented in such a way that they
output proofs that Dedukti can check.
Our goal here has been to provide a technology-independent means of defining
the semantics of a range of proof formats in classical and intuitionistic logics. While
our specifications are, in principle, implementable as relational specifications (logic
programs), this paper has not been concerned with exploring the many ways that such
specifications can be converted into effective proof checkers.
14 Conclusions
The promise of focused proof systems has always been that they can be used to describe
synthetic inference rules. We have shown how the focused proof systems, LJF and LKF,
for first-order intuitionistic and classical logics can be augmented in such a way that
the simple relational specifications—the clerk and expert predicates—can be used to
describe such synthetic rules. We have then gone on to illustrate how a range of proof
systems can be encoded as just such synthetic rules. In this way, we view our augmented
focused proof system as both a formal definition of those proof systems as well as an
executable specification that can be used to check (and partially reconstruct) such
proof systems. We have also shown how the more expressive intuitionistic logic proof
system can easily and directly be used to define and check classical logic proof systems.
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